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ABSTRACT
This research report is a study on joint ventures in
China. In the study, a questionnaire survey is conducted
on some 26 equity joint ventures in various parts of
China. Through the eyes of the foreign managers and
assistant managers, the major problems facing equity joint
ventures in China are identified. Two case studies are
also undertaken to highlight the problems. Based on these
results, six major areas of concern are identified, name-
ly, foreign exchange, joint venture laws and regulations,
infrastructure supports, labor, quality control and raw
materials, and organization structure and management.
Recommendations to tackle these problems are proposed.
The 22 incentive articles promulgated by the Chinese
Government are also discussed in detail. At the end of
the research study, a systematic approach to commencing
equity joint ventures in China is suggested.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 A Brief History of Joint Ventures in China
At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central
Committee Meeting in December, 1978, China embarked on the
most ambitious economic course in her history. After the
great chaos -of the Great Cultural Revolution when the
country took a gigantic step backwards, China decided to
face her socio-economical problems head-on.
Agricultural and industrial outputs were targeted to
be quadrupled by the turn of the century. Incentives and
profits were introduced. Profit motives, under the guise
of the production responsibility system, were successful
in the rural areas. However, economic reforms in the
cities and industrial sectors were dead slow.
As part of her efforts to present a more enlightened
face to the world of nations as well as to gain access to
foreign capitals, technology, and markets, China started
to encourage joint ventures between her regional authori-
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ties and foreign companies. Compatriots from Hong Kong
and Macau, overseas Chinese 'and foreigners were encouraged
to invest in China either in the name of an economic
entity or as an individual, as stated in Clause 18 of the
Constitution:
"The People's Republic of China permits foreign
enterprises and other economic organizations or indivi-
duals to make investments in China, or enter into economic
cooperation in various forms with Chinese enterprises or
other economic organizations, as far as the Chinese laws
allow."
In July 1979, China promulgated the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investments. It is stated in Article One that:
"With a view to expanding international economic co-
operation and technological exchange, the People's Repub-
lic of China permits foreign companies, enterprises, other
economic entities or individuals (hereinafter referred to
as foreign participants) to incorporate themselves, within
the territory of the People's Republic of China, into
joint ventures with Chinese companies, enterprises or
other economic entities (hereinafter referred to as
Chinese participants) on the principle of equality and
mutual benefit and subject to authorization by the Chinese
Government."
There are normally three modes of foreign participa-
tions: i) Foreign joint ventures, also known as equity
joint ventures, are joint operations in the form of share-
holding rights ii) Cooperative operations, also known
as contractual joint ventures, are joint operations in the
form of agreements and iii) Wholly-owned foreign ven-
tures.
3
The results have been impressive. Between 1979 and
1986, China has signed numerous contracts with foreign
investors. These contracts include 2,300 equity joint
ventures, 3,700 contractual joint ventures, and 120
wholly-owned foreign ventures. The total foreign
1
investment pledged amounts to US$ 16 billions.
1.2 Rationale of Joint Venturing
From the foreigners' point of view, China is a coun-
try they cannot ignore. The country presents a massive
market potential as well as a credible competitive threat.
Extrapolation of her average economic growth rate of the
past thirty years will push her GNP to over US$ 1 trillion
by the year 2000. As a merchandizing source, China has
abundant natural resources and a large labor supply. As a
formidable competitor, China has the human resources,
drives, and development momentum to catapult herself into
the world class competition in high technology.
Whether we take China as a potential market, or
competitive source, we can further subdivide the two lines
into three different modes or levels, namely, 1) trading,
2) licensing, and 3) investments (joint venturing).
1The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, December
30, 1986.
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Initially, most foreign involvements tend to focus on
trading with heavy emphasis on exporting to China. Owing
to currency restriction and Chinese policies, the tendency
is to pull foreign investments into the other brackets and
especially into joint ventures.
From the Chinese point of view, foreign participation
is essential to help her modernize her economy. Joint
ventures, in particular, is a crucial element to lure
foreign funds, technology, and managerial expertise into
China. The country favors this investment vehicle of
equity joint venture because it offers the best access to
Western equipment and technical know-how without having to
buy them. The technology and equipment are usually treated
as foreign investment in equity joint ventures, while the
Chinese partners would contribute buildings and site
areas.
5
1.3 Statistics on Sino-foreign Joint Ventures, 1979--1985
According to The Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela-
tions and Trade (MOFERT), 2,302 equity joint ventures were
formed up to the end of 1985 (Table 1).
Based on the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic
Relations And Trade, 1985, and the China Investment Guide,
1986, there were 841 equity joint ventures formed between
2
1979 and 1984. The nature and sources, as well as the
locations and values of these joint ventures are shown
in Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5.
2 The south China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August 11,
1986
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TABLE 1
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES, 1979-1985
YEAR NO OF EQUITY JOINT
VENTURES FORMED
1979-1982 83
1983 107
1984 741
1,3711985
4501986 (Jan--Aug)
Source: The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong,
August 11, 1986. (Data from MOFERT)
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TABLE 2
NATURE OF JOINT VENTURES, 1979-1985
Nature of Joint Amount of For- Percentage
Ventures eign Investment of total
(US$ Millions) Investment
Property 550 41.23
Light industries 235 17.63
Machinery 196 14.69
Servicing 121 9.08
105 7.88Technical Services
86 6.48Electronics
2.2730Minerals Metals
7 0.51Farming
100.001,330
Source: The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong,
August 11, 1986.
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TABLE 3
JOINT VENTURES ON A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY BASIS
1979-1985
Country Percentage of Percentage of
Total Projects Total Investment
Hong Kong/Macau 77.5 58.6
U.S.A. 7.0 9.6
6.3Japan 15.6
4.1 9.3Europe
4.13.3Asia
2.51.1Others
0.30.7Unknown
Source: The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong,
August 11, 1986.
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TABLE 4
LOCATION OF JOINT VENTURES,
1979-1985
Location Percentage of Equity
Joint Ventures in the
Location
Guangdong 45
Fujian 15
Beijing 5
Tianjin 5
Shanghai 4
Other Coastal
Provinces 13
13Inland Provinces
Source: The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong,
August 11, 1986.
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TABLE 5
VALUES (ASSETS) OF JOINT VENTURES,
1979-1985
Value Percentage of Total
(US$ Millions) Equity Joint Ventures
1 and below 53.0
1- 10 37.9
10- 50 5.7
50- 100 0.8
Above 100 0.4
1.7Unknown
Source: The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong,
AucUst 11. 1986.
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From the statistics and other related reports, the
following characteristics are observed:
1. Most equity joint ventures are of small scale:
The total investments in 53 percent of the
joint ventures (446 cases out of a total of 841) are
US$1 million and below. Another 38 percent (319 cases)
has a total investment between US$ 1 and 10 millions.
Only 1.1 percent (10 cases) could be considered as
large-scale projects in which the investments exceed
US$50 millions.
2. Most equity joint ventures are of short to medium
terms:
Fifty-six percent (468 cases) of the joint venture
agreements is signed for ten years or less, 27 percent
(229 cases) from ten to twenty years, 11 percent (98
cases) from twenty to thirty years, with less than two
percent (15 cases), for more than thirty years. Most
investors, especially small investors, prefer short-
term projects that promise fast returns.
3. The joint ventures are concentrated on real estate,
light industries, and the service industries.
About 62 percent (523 cases) of the equity joint
12
ventures are in light industries, hotels, office build-
ings, and the service sectors. Technical services and
engineering projects amount to only 10 percent (89
cases). They include projects such as oil exploita-
tion, well logging, and construction engineering
services. Among them, only 4 percent (34 cases) can be
classified as heavy machinery.
It is worth noting that although real estate
amounts to only 8 percent of the total cases, it con-
stitutes 42 percent of the total foreign investments--
US$ 550 millions.
4. Hong Kong and Macau are the chief sources of foreign
investments, but mostly for smaller enterprises:
Of the 841 equity joint ventures, Hong Kong and
Macau investments amount to almost 80 percent (660
cases). However, the capitals invested account for
only 58 percent of the total foreign investments. The
cultural and language advantages, the geographical and
other ties of the Hong Kong and Macau investors to
China, are obvious. It is noted that investments from
Europe and the Gulf. countries are generally absent.
MOFERT officials admit that they have to work harder
to attract investments from these countries.
13
5. Most joint ventures are located in the southern
provinces, the special economic zones, and the big
cities.
Because of special policies and flexible measures,
over 60 percent of the equity joint ventures is located
in the special economic zones and the two provinces of
Guangdong and Fujian. Other joint ventures scatter
throughout the coastal and inland provinces including
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hebei, Liaoning, Guangxi, Henan,
Gansu, and even Urumuqi in Xinjiang.
Guangdong, close to Hong Kong and with a better
infrastructure, has the biggest share of investments.
Up to 45 percent (378 cases) of the equity joint ven-
tures is located in the province. Among these, 27 per-
cent (228 cases) is in Shenzhen, the first special eco-
nomic zone in China. By the end of January 1987, the
SEZ has already signed 4,947 projects with foreign
investors. Foreign companies have invested about US$
960 millions in the zone, amounting to 18 percent of
the total foreign investments in the country.
Although the statistics are encouraging, there is a
feeling that the joint venture policy has fallen short of
the original expectations. The figure of US$ 16 billions
foreign investment pledged up to the end of 1986 looks im-
pressive, but it is apparent that China has failed to
14
attract foreign investment in the areas of high technology
and basic infrastructure. Most joint ventures are small
scale and of limited lifespan. Joint ventures in China is
not easy. The concept brings together two social, politi-
cal and economic systems that come from opposite ends of
the spectrum, and have minimal contact for over thirty
years. Difficulties and problems are therefore magnified
by clashes in values between China and the West, and the
enormous technology gap. Coupled with China's foreign
exchange shortages and economic retrenchment since 1985,
there begins a decline in new foreign investment. In the
first three quarters of 1986, new foreign investment
plunged 40 percent as compared with the same period in
1985. Up to August 31, 1986, there are only 450 equity
joint ventures signed in the year, as compared with 1,371
for the same period in 1985. The value of contracts
signed is US$ 2.4 billion, representing a substantial drop
of 42 percent.
In a study conducted in early 1986 to find out the
regional preferences of investments by medium to small-
size Japanese firms, the Japanese Overseas Development
Corporation reveals that Japanese firms are more interes-
ted in investing in Taiwan than China. In the study, 161
firms respond and their first choice is Taiwan. The
respondents believe that Taiwan is better than China in
3
terms of management skills.
JThe South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, December,
30, 1986.
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Although no big company has withdrawn from China,
many have scaled down their operations, and some may have
actually been considering about withdrawal. The slowdown
and drop in new foreign investment for the first time in
China's joint venture history indicate flagging foreign
interest and a more cautious and critical trend among
foreign investors in starting new ventures in China.
In July 1986, the State Council stepped in. An
emergency directive was issued instructing various minis-
tries and regions to study ways to ensure the success of
all foreign investment projects, demonstrating Beijing's
goodwills to remove the obstacles threatening the well-
beings of foreign investments. The State Council also
began a full investigation into the grievances of foreign
investors. The study, covering major investment ventures,
aims to confirm the difficulties of doing business in
China, and to pave the way for a new era of concessions.
China is not about to retreat behind the barricades
again. Nor are the foreign investors about to give up in
disgust and dismay the huge market in China. Eventually
not only would the proletariats want to swap their radios
for the color televisions, they might also upgrade their
pedal power from the bicycles to automobile accelerators.
Given the limited infrastructure and technical handicaps,
it is unrealistic for China to expect an avalanche of hi-
16
tech investments. Nor is there anything wrong with in-
vestments in the service and light industries which boost
China's tourist industry, improve the country's product
quality, and raise the country's quality of living. The
slowdown may yet prove a blessing in disguise if it pro-
vides the much needed breathing space for China to improve
her infrastructure and solve some of the problems.
1.4 Research Methodoloav and Scope of Studv
This research report is conducted to study equity
joint ventures in China, the problems they faced, and
their possible solutions. Questionnaires (Appendix 1) are
sent to the foreign managers of some 100 equity joint
ventures in China. The purpose is to identify the major
problems facing equity joint ventures from the view-points
of foreign investors. Two case studies are then under-
taken to highlight some of these problems. Tentative
solutions are proposed and discussed with reference to the
actions being taken recently by China, notably the 22
incentive articles promulgated in October 1986. At the end
of the research study, a systematic approach to commencing
equity joint ventures in China is suggested.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SURVEY
1
One hundred and twenty-five sets of questionnaire
have been sent to different equity joint ventures in China,
based on the authors' personal connections and informa-
tion provided in the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade, and the China Investment Guide. The
areas covered include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Fujian,
Guangdong, and other coastal provinces. A total of 33
replies (representing a response rate of 26.4 percent),
have been received from the foreign general managers and
assistant managers of the surveyed enterprises. Seven
questionnaires are discarded as they are from trading
firms or 100 percent foreign owned business firms. The
findings of the remaining 26 equity joint ventures are
discussed in this chapter.
The questionnaire is divided into four main sections.
Section I provides general information on the joint ven-
1
Part of the questionnaire has been adopted with per-
mission from the questionnaire used by Dr. M.K. Nyaw in
his paper An Empirical Study of the Organizational Attri-
butes and Structure of Joint Ventures in Shenzhen, Chi
18
tures. Section II then investigates the operations of
the joint ventures. Section III is a study of the organi-
zation structure and management of the joint ventures. In
the last section, Section IV, the overall perception and
comments from the foreign general managers and assistant
managers are gathered. Based on these results, the pro-
blems that equity joint ventures in China are facing as
viewed from the viewpoints of the foreign investors are
identified and discussed with statistical interpretations.
2.1 Empirical Results
2.1.1 General Information
1. General nature of equity joint ventures
The origins of the foreign partners in the 26 equity
joint ventures are tabulated in Table 6A. The majority of
the investments comes from Hong Kong and Macau, while the
United States of America and Japan are also important
foreign investors. Europe continues to be the area where
foreign investments are difficult to secure.
The bulk of the equity joint ventures are entities in
manufacturing and services (Table 6B). In the table,
manufacturing includes light industries, machinery, elec-
tronics and property developments, while services include
19
hotels, offices and other service sectors. These two main
categories account for 69 percent of the 26 joint ventures
surveyed. Trading, mixed and others (for example, husban-
dry, metals and minerals) account for the remaining 31
percent.
Of the 26 equity joint ventures, about half of them
(46 percent, representing 12 joint ventures) has a total
investment of less than US $1 million (Table 7A).'
From the survey, it indicates that the Chinese part-
ners would normally provide the necessary site area. In
the majority of the cases, the Chinese partners would also
provide the necessary buildings for the joint ventures.
The foreign partners would usually provide technology (89
percent) and machinery (79 percent) (Table 7B).
All 26 joint ventures are in operation for more than
one year. The profit and loss situations are tabulated in
Table 8 according to the total investments. It is found
that 58 percent (15 cases) of the joint ventures is making
profits while 30 percent (8 cases) is operating at a loss.
The remaining 12 percent (3 cases) is unknown.
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TABLE 6
GENERAL INFORMATION OF THE EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
A. ORIGIN OF FOREIGN PARTNERS:
Number of Joint Percentage of
Ventures Total Number
Hong Kong Macau 17 65
Japan 3 12
U.S.A. 4 15
Europe 2 8
0Others 0
26 100
B. AREA OF BUSINESS:
Percentage ofNumber of Joint
Total NumberVentures
236Manufacturing
4612Services
72Trading
123Mixed
123Others
10026
21
TABLE 7
EQUITY FORMATION OF THE JOINT VENTURES
A. TOTAL INVESTMENT:
Total Investment Number of Joint Percentage of
Ventures(US$) Total Number
Less than 100,000 5 19
From 100,000 to 1M 7 27
More than 1 Million 14 54
26 100
u
B. PROVISION OF ASSETS:
By Foreign By Chinese
PartnersPartners
PercentagePercentage NumberNumber
1002200Land
7414265Building
1128916Technology
2147915Machinery
The total investment is the total amount of capitals
from both the Chinese and foreign partners.
JD
The total number in each item may not add up to 26
because not all respondents answer the question.
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TABLE 8
PROFIT AND LOSS SITUATIONS OF THE
a
JOINT VENTURES
Total Investments Making Profit At a Loss
(US$)
Number Percent Number Percen-
Less than 100,000 1 4 4 15
From 100,000 to 1M 3 12 4 15
More than 1 millio: 11 42
15 58 8 30
Three of the joint ventures did not answer this question.
23
2. Foreign exchange situations
The foreign managers are asked if the equity joint
2
ventures have any Renminbi surplus, how do they utilize
their Renminbi revenues, and how do they remit foreign
currency overseas. The results are tabulated in Table 9.
Of the 26 equity joint ventures, 58 percent (15
cases) has a surplus of Renminbi. Forty-two percent (11
cases) either takes no Renminbi or needs more Renminbi
(Table 9A). All 26 equity joint ventures have more than
one use of Renminbi. Typically, the ventures use Renminbi
to pay local staff and workers as well as local expenses.
The details are summarized in Table 9B. All the joint
ventures remit dividends overseas to the parent companies.
Besides dividends, hard currency is also remitted in the
forms of royalties, management fees and patent fees (Table
9C).
On the question of foreign exchange losses, all the
joint ventures report losses. The main reasons are dual
exchange rates, Renminbi devaluation and interest expenses
as Renminbi received cannot be converted to hard currency
immediately (Table 10)..
2
Renminbi is the Chinese currency. In May, 1987 the
conversion rate is HK$ 100 to approximately 48 yuans
Renminbi.
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TABLE 9
FOREIGN EXCHANGE SITUATIONS OF THE
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
A. RENMINBI SITUATION:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Large RMB surplus 12 46
A few RMB in reserve 7 27
Takes no RMB 4 15
Needs more RMB 3 12
26 100
C
B. USES OF RENMINBI:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Pay for salary and wages 26 100
26 100Pay for local materials
8522Pay for utilities
10026Pay for local expenses
7720Expand present operation
10026Pay for workers' welfare
359Re-invest in other business
Extend Renminbi loans to
123needed parties
154Deposit in banks
154Convert to hard currency
25
TABLE 9 (Cont'd)
b
C. REMITTANCE OF HARD CURRENCY OVERSEAS:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Dividends 26 100
Royalties 10 38
Management fees 15 62
Patent fees 5 19
Others 7 27
a
The total number exceeds 26 as there are usually more
than one usage of the Renminbi revenue.
b
The total number exceeds 26 as the joint ventures
usually remit hard currency in more than one form.
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TABLE 10
FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES OF THE
JOINT VENTURES
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Due to dual exchange rates 18 69
Due to RMB devaluation 20 77
Due to interest expenses 16 62
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3. Joint venture laws and regulations
Joint ventures in China are governed by the Law of
the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using
Chinese And Foreign Investments. The law was adopted on
July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress and promulgated on July 8, 1979. Subse-
quently, other related laws and regulations have been pro-
mulgated, including:
-Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labor
Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese And Foreign
Investments (promulgated by the State Council on July 26,
1980).
-Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the
Registrations of Joint Ventures Using Chinese And Foreign
Investments (promulgated by the State Council on July 26,
1981).
-Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Using Chinese And Foreign
Investments (promulgated by the State Council on Septem-
ber 20, 1983).
-The Accounting Regulations of the People's Republic of
China for the Joint Ventures Using Chinese And Foreign
Investments (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance of
28
the People's Republic of China on March 4, 1985).
Responses from all the foreign managers of the equity
joint ventures relating to the implementation of the joint
venture laws are similar. All respondents complain that
the laws are sometimes interpreted differently. About
half of them (12 cases) suggests that the joint venture
laws and regulations are sometimes overruled by local laws
(Table 11A). The Chinese partners very often just pick up
what they want from the laws (Table 11B).
29
TABLE 11
LAWS AND REGULATIONS FOR JOINT VENTURES
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS:
Number of Ventures
Well-observed 0
Sometimes overruled by local laws 12
Sometimes interpreted differently 26
Not followed 0
B. CHINESE PARTNERS' KNOWLEDGE OF THE JOINT VENTURE LAWS:
Number of Ventures
22They know the law
20They pick up what they want
2They do not know the law
The total number exceeds 26 as some respondents give
more than one answer to this question.
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2.1.2 Operations
1. Infrastructure
Infrastructure supports of sufficient electric and
water supply, good roads, proper drainage systems, good
communication networks and so on, are vital to the success
of the joint ventures.
Infrastructure supports to the equity joint ventures
during the initial set-up stage and the final opera-
tion stage are examined. During the set-up stage, the
availability of various aspects of infrastructure supports
are investigated. These include electricity supply, water
supply, land formation, buildings, road systems and commu-
nication networks. The most acute problem is electricity
supply in which 58 percent (15 cases) reports that the
joint ventures do not have electricity supply when they
begin setting up their business (Table 12A).
During operation, 81 percent of the joint ventures
(21 cases) reports problems in power supply. The problem
usually takes the forms of supply interruptions and inade-
quate power. Water supply and maintenance of plant
equipment are also causing problems (Table 12B). As a
result, 13 of the equity joint ventures surveyed have
their own backup power supply units. Six others are
planning to install their back up power supply.
31
TABLE 12
INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORTS FOR THE
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
A. DURING INITIAL SET-UP:
Number of Ventures
AvailablE Not Available
Electricity Supply 11 15
Water Supply 18 8
Site Area 15 11
Buildings 12 14
Road System 15 11
Communication Networks 12 14
B. DURING OPERATIONS:
Number of Ventures
Available Not Available
21 5Electricity Supply
12 14Water Supply
Maintenance of Plant
1214Equipment
32
2. Labor
The total number of employees in the 26 joint ven-
tures is tabulated in Table 13A. The total number of
employees ranges from below five to more than five hun-
dred, with the majority of the ventures employing 50 to
200 workers (13 cases). All equity joint ventures report
the 'back door' phenomenon. The survey indicates an ave-
rage of about 15 percent workers coming in through the
'back door'.
The average monthly salary in the 26 joint ventures
is summarized in Table 13B. From the survey, it is
revealed that the total amount of bonuses and subsidies
for ordinary workers and technical staff exceeds the basic
salary. The situation is reversed for the managers. All
the joint ventures offer incentives to their workers. The
most common forms are annual increments, medical
insurance, meals, bonus and prizes (Table 13C).
All the 26 equity joint ventures provide training for
their workers, either with training teams or training
their supervisors abroad and letting them train up the
local workers (Table 14A).
The equity joint ventures select their workers either
from the Labor Service Bureau, the original workers of the
Chinese partners, and/or open applications. From the
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survey, it appears that all three sources are quite evenly
distributed among the 26 equity joint ventures (Table
14B). On the other hand, the appointment of workers is
usually through a joint effort by both the Chinese and
foreign partners or by the Chinese partners (Table 14C).
On the subject of discipline, only 38 percent (10
cases) of the 26 equity joint ventures surveyed has
established disciplinary system (Table 15A). Commenting on
their Chinese partners' attitude towards disciplinary
action, 38 percent of the foreign managers believes that
their Chinese partners' attitude is negative, 38 percent
believes that the attitude is positive, while the remain-
ing 24 percent gives a neutral attitude answer (Table 15B).
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TABLE 13
LABOR SITUATIONS OF THE EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
A. TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES:
Number of Ventures Percentage
5 and Below 2 8
11-50 4 15
51-100 7 27
101-200 6 23
201-500 5 19
501 and Above 2 8
26 100
B. AVERAGE MONTHLY SALARY: (VALUES IN RENMINBI)
Ordinary Technical Managers
Workers Staff
Salary 143 205 260
Bonus 132 182 198
Other Subsidies 37 37 37
a
C. INCENTIVES OFFERED BY THE JOINT VENTURES:
Number of Ventures
Offering the Incentive
26Annual Increments
20Bonus
22Meals
26Medical
7Tours
10Housing
12Prizes
10Promotion
4Others
a
The total number exceeds 26 as more than one type of
incentives is installed in each joint venture.
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TABLE 14
TRAINING, SOURCES, AND APPOINTMENT OF WORKERS
a
A. TRAINING MODES:
Number of Ventures
On the job training 12
Training with a training team 15
Training supervisors abroad and
letting them train the workers 9
B. SOURCES:
Number of Ventures
Referred by the Labor Service Bureau 8
11Originally from the Chinese partner
Selected from Open Applications 11
C. APPOINTMENT:
Number of Ventures Percentage
14 54Jointly
10 38Solely by Chinese Partner
2 8Solely by Foreign Partner
a
The total number exceeds 26 as some joint ventures
have more than one mode of training.
b
The number exceeds 26 as some joint ventures havE
more than one source of workers.
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TABLE 15
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM OF THE
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Has disciplinary system 10 38
Disciplinary system under
consideration 6 24
No disciplinary system 10 38
26 100
B. CHINESE PARTNERS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS DISCIPLINARY ACTION:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Positive attitude 10 38
6 24Neutral
10 38Negative attitude
26 100
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3. Quality control
Quality control measures are vital as they ensure
products quality and compatibility. Twenty-four of the
equity joint ventures respond to the question. The majo-
rity of them, 75 percent (18 cases), have set up quality
assurance department. Four ventures are considering set-
ting up the department. Only 8 percent (2 cases) responds
that quality assurance department is not required (Table
16A). More than three-quarters of the joint ventures
employ local staff to carry out quality control duties.
Only four joint ventures employ expatriates to perform the
necessary quality control works (Table 16B).
The survey also reveals that quality control measures
are not well accepted among local staff. In the 18 joint
ventures that have quality assurance department, the
quality control measures are well accepted in only 7
cases, representing 39 percent of the responded cases.
The attitudes in the other joint ventures are either
reluctantly accepted (28 percent) or completely ignored
(33 percent) (Table 16C).
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TABLE 16
QUALITY ASSURANCE MEASURES OF THE
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
a
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT:
No of Ventures Percentage
Has Quality Assurance
Department 18 75
No Quality-Assurance
Department 2 8
Quality Assurance
Department under
Consideration 4 17
24 100
b
B. STAFFING OF THE QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT:
Number of Ventures Percentage
Quality assurance by
local staff 14 78
Quality assurance by
4expatriates 22
18 100
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TABLE 16 (Cont'd)
C. ACCEPTANCE OF QUALITY CONTROL CONCEPTS BY LOCAL STAFF:C
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Well accepted 7 39
Reluctantly accepted 5 28
Ignored 6 33
18 100
a
Two joint ventures did not answer this question.
Therefore the total number of respondents is 24.
b
With reference to Table A, there are 18 joint ven-
tures with quality assurance department.
c
Eighteen joint ventures have quality assurance
department.
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4. Production
Twenty-two equity joint ventures responded to the
question of scheduling ability. Fourteen of them (63
percent) can usually meet the schedule. Five cases (23
percent) respond that they cannot meet the schedule. The
other three cases (14 percent) respond that there is no
scheduling at all (Tables 17A).
The problems on production scheduling include raw
materials delays, maintenance problems in production
machinery, inadequate skilled workers, bad working
attitudes and ethics, insufficient supervision and bureau-
cratic inefficiency (Table 17B). It is worth noting that
95 percent of the joint ventures (21 out of 22 cases)
identifies raw materials delay as a major problem. The
raw materials supply problem is due to a number of
factors, including quality, delivery, transportation,
purchasing procedures, import procedures and availability
(Tables 17C).
The level of computerization is low. Among the 24
equity joint ventures who respond, only three of them are
extensively computerized. Another six ventures have
achieved a small extent of computerization. The percent-
age of employees who is capable of using computers ranges
from 2 to 8 percent.
41
TABLE 17
SCHEDULING AND PRODUCTION OF THE
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
a
A. SCHEDULING ABILITY:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Schedules usually met with
a few delays 14 63
Schedules usually not met 5 23
No scheduling 3 14
22 100
B. MAJOR PROBLEMS IN PRODUCTION SCHEDULING:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Raw materials delays 21 95
Maintenance problems in
15plant equipment 68
9Inadequate skilled workers 41
Bad working attitudes and
13 59ethics
18 82Insufficient supervision
11 50Bureaucratic inefficiency
42
TABLE 17 (font' d)
C
C. MAJOR PROBLEMS IN RAW MATERIALS SUPPLY:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Quality 12 57
Delivery 9 43
Transportation 9 43
Purchasing procedures 7 33
Import procedures 12 57
Availability 1 5
u
Four joint ventures did not answer this question.
Thus, the total number of equity joint ventures is 22.
D
The total exceeds 22 because each joint venture
identifies more than one problem.
C
The total exceeds 22 because usually the joint ven-
tures identify more than one problem in raw materials
supply.
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2.1.3 Organization Structure and Management
Section III of the questionnaire examines the organi-
zation structure and management of the equity joint ven-
tures. The survey reveals that the board of directors are
almost always composed of equal numbers of Chinese and
foreign directors. The total number of directors ranges
from four to ten as shown in Table 18A.
Based on the 26 equity joint ventures surveyed, the
chairman of the board is always a Chinese. On the other
hand, the general manager is usually an expatriate (20
cases, representing 77 percent). The deputy general
managers are usually taken up by the Chinese and foreign
expatriates on a 50-50 split.
On the question of departmentation, the majority of
the joint ventures (22 out of 26 responses) are based on
functions. The total number of departments in a joint
venture ranges mostly from four to more than ten (Table
18B).
The total number of management levels varies from two
to five while the span of management (the number of
departments or subordinates a manager supervises) ranges
from less than three to more than twenty (Table 18C and
18D).
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From the survey, it is revealed that only 50 percent
(ten out of twenty responses) of the equity joint ventures
has organization charts (Table 18E). On the other hand, a
majority of 70 percent (14 out of 20 responses) has annual
budgets (Table 18F). The major decisions are either made
by the board of directors, general managers/deputy general
managers, or department heads (Table 18G).
Concerning foreign managerial involvement in the
organization of the joint ventures, the majority is
confined to top management level (65 percent, representing
14 cases). Only 35 percent (8 cases) reports that there
is foreign' involvement in both top and middle management.
The major areas of involvement .from foreign managers are
shown in Table 18H.
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TABLE 18
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
A. BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
Number of Directors Number of Ventures Percentage
4 4 15
6 12 46
8 5 20
9 1 4
10. 4 15
26 100
B. DEPARTMENTATIOt
Number of Percentage
Ventures
4 Departments 9 35
5 Departments 4 15
6 Departments 2 8
7 Departments 5 19
4 158 Departments
More than 10 Departments 2 8
26 100
a
C. NUMBER OF MANAGEMENT LEVELS:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
822 levels
56143 levels
1234 levels
2465 levels
10025
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TABLE 18 (font' d)
D. SPAN OF MANAGEMENT:
Number of Ventures Percentage
Less than 3 1 4
4 to 10 18 75
11 to 20 4 17
More than 20 1 4
24 100
E. ORGANIZATION CHART: C
Number of Percentage
Ventures
Has organization chart 10 50
Under consideration 5 25
Not necessary 5 25
20 100
F. ANNUAL BUDGETING: C
Number of Percentage
Ventures
12Has annual budget 60
3Under consideration 15
5 25No budget
20 100
G. MAJOR DECISION MAKING LEVEL: C
Number of Percentage
Ventures
5510Board of Directors
General Manager/Deputy
255General Managers
255Department Heads
10020
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TABLE 18 (Cont' d)
d
H. MAJOR AREAS OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT:
Number of Percentage
Ventures
22Strategic planning 100
Marketing Sales 22 100
Finance 18 82
Technical 20 91
Personnel 5 23
a
one joint venture gives an answer of 26 levels. The
answer is discarded.
b
Two joint ventures do not answer this question.
The total number is twenty as six joint ventures do
not answer this question.
d
A total of 22 joint ventures answer this question.
Foreign involvement may occur in more than one area.
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2.1.4 Overall Perception and Comments
Section IV of the questionnaire examines the foreign
partners' perception on equity joint ventures in China.
Using the Likert-type five-point scale, the most important
priority for improvement is given a 5-point while the
least important priority is given a 1-point. The average
value and standard deviation of each criterion are then
computed. The results are tabulated in Table 19.
The foreign managers rank less red tape and more
clear cut division of authority in the Chinese government
Bureaux as-top priorities for improvement. Also of high
priorities are better training to the Chinese management
and workers, and stronger disciplinary systems, reflecting
the concerns of the foreign partners about the lack of
control in their fellow workers.
The second last priority is more cooperations from
the Chinese partners, indicating that, from the eyes of
the foreign partners, their Chinese counterparts are in
general cooperative. The last priority in the list is more
authorities to the Chinese management. Foreign partners
maintain that it is not the right time for the Chinese
management to take up too much authority, consistent with
the second priority that Chinese management should be
better trained.
49
TABLE 19
OVERALL COMMENTS ON JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA
Average Standard Ranking
Value Deviatior
Less red tape and more clear
cut division of authority
in the Chinese Government
Bureaux 4.70 0.48 1
Stronger and better trained
Chinese management 4.20 1.14 2
Better and more training 4.18 0.92 3
Disciplinary systems should
be stronger 4.00 0.82 4
Employ better educated
workers/staff 3.90 1.10 5
Less bureaucratic Inter-
ventions 3.89 1.10 6
More freehands in the
incentive system 3.80 1.03 7
The technical staff and
managers should be paid
3.78 0.67 8higher
3.70 1.42 9Less Party interventions
3.60 1.07 10Paid the workers better
More cooperations from the
3.60 1.35 11Chinese partners
More authorities to the
122.90 1.60Chinese management
502.2 Analysis
Based on the primary data collected from the
questionnaire survey, statistical correlations and
interpretations are performed with the aim of identifying
the major problems confronting equity joint ventures in
China. Unfortunately, due to the limited sample size--
totalling 26, the statistical significance of the various
relationships can therefore at best serve as indicative
guides only. Nevertheless, it is hoped that they are
helpful for further study of joint ventures in China.
From Table 8, it is found that large ventures are
more profitable than small ones. All the 11 joint ven-
tures with total investments greater than US$ 1.0 million
respond that they are making profits. The situation is
more even for the group of joint ventures with total
investments between US$ 0.1 and 1.0 million. Among the
seven respondents, three are making profits while the
other four are operating at a loss. The situation is
worst for the joint ventures with total investments less
than US$ 0.1 million. Four out of five respondents are
reporting losses. With such observations, the primary
data from the questionnaire are consolidated into three
groups of differing total investments, namely, less than
US$ 0.1 million, between US$ 0.1 and 1.0 million and more
than US$ 1.0 million. From Section I of the questionnaire,
the areas of foreign exchange, joint venture laws and
regulations are investigated. Infrastructure support,
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labour policy and quality control are then studied based
on results from Section II of the questionnaire. Finally,
organization structure and management are examined based
on data from Section III of the questionnaire.
2.2.1 Foreign Exchange
The problems of foreign exchange balance and foreign
exchange losses are investigated. Based on Table 9A, the
primary data are reorganized into Table 20A. It is found
that all three groups of equity joint ventures experience
similar problems in foreign exchange balance and the
majority of them have a surplus of Renminbi. It is also
revealed that all 26 equity joint ventures suffer foreign
exchange losses (Table 20B). Based on the limited sample
size, it is suggested that problems of foreign exchange
balance and losses are common in joint ventures in China.
2.2.2 Joint Venture Laws and Regulations
From the questionnaire survey, all joint ventures
respond that the joint venture laws and regulations are
sometimes interpreted differently. About half of them also
respond that the laws are sometimes overruled by local
laws (Table 11A). Also there is the general consensus that
the Chinese partners very often just pick up what they
want (Table 11B). These suggest that the interpretation
and implementation of the joint venture laws and
regulations are causing problems and concern in China.
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TABLE 20
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROBLEMS
A. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BALANCE:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Large Renminbi surplus 2 3 7
A few Renminbi in
reserve 2 2 3
Takes no Renminbi 1 1 2
Needs more Renminbi 0 1 2
5 7 14
B. FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES:a
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
1,000,000100,000 1,000,000
Due to dual exchange
6 93rates
Due to Renminbi
105 5devaluation
104Due to interest expenses
a The joint venture may report more than one reason of
foreign exchange losses.
2
532.2.3 Infrastructure Support
The questionnaire studies the availability of various
aspects of infrastructure supports during the set-up
stage with particular emphasis on electricity and water
supply, site area and buildings, road system and
communication networks. In the operation stage,
infrastructure support of water and electricity supplies,
and the maintenance of plant equipment are investigated.
The primary data from Table 12 are reorganized into
Tables 21A and 21B. For both the set-up and commercial
operation -stages, the percentage availability of each
aspect of infrastructure support to the three groups of
joint ventures of different total investment is computed.
The average infrastructure support for the two different
stages to these three groups are then calculated by taking
the average availability of the different aspects of
support in each stage (Table 21C).
During the set-up stage, the infrastructure support
ranges from 52 to 60 percent, indicating that slightly
more than half of the necessary infrastructures are
available when the joint ventures begin their operation in
China. The results are quite uniform, irrespective of the
total investment of the joint ventures.
During commercial operation, the infrastructure
support ranges from 27 percent for the smaller joint
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ventures to 45 percent for the larger joint ventures.
Although the sample size of the present research
study is limited, it is decided a test of whether there is
correlation between infrastructure support and total
investment of the joint ventures is desirable. A chi-
square test is performed using a Ho hypothesis of
Infrastructure support is independent of the size of the
joint ventures.
At the 0.05 level of significance, the chi-square
test indicates that the H. hypothesis is accepted (Table
21D). Such preliminary conclusion suggests that
infrastructure support is independent of the total
investment of the joint ventures. The lack of support is
common to joint ventures in China, based on the 26
responses from the questionnaire survey.
55
TABLE 21
CONSOLIDATED DATA ON INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORTS
A. DURING SET-UP STAGE:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investment (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Electric Supply
Available 2 4 5
Not Available 3 3 9
Water Supply
Available 4 5 9
Not Available 1 2 5
Site Area
Available 3 4 8
Not Available 2 3 6
Building
Available 4 2 6
Not Available 1 5 8
Road System
3Available 3 9
2Not Available 4 5
Communication Networks
2 4 6Available
3 3 8Not Available
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TABLE 21 (Cont'd)
B. DURING COMMERCIAL OPERATION:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (us$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Power Supply
5With problems 6 10
No problem 0 1 4
Water Supply
3With problems 3 6
2No problem 4 8
Maintenance
3With problems 4 7
2No problem 3 7
C. AVERAGE INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More Than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
During set-up 60% 52% 5.2%
During operation 27% 38% 45%
D. THE CHI-SQUARE TEST:
Ham, hypothesis: Infrastructure support is independent
of the size of the joint ventures.
= 5.991
0.05
= 0.263
calculated
Conclusion: H. hypothesis accepted
x2
x2
572.2.4 Labor
Of the equity joint ventures surveyed, the salary
structure is similar among all ventures. The average
monthly salary has been tabulated in Table 13B. In
addition, all joint ventures provide incentives to the
workers and there are usually more than one form of
incentive (Table 13C). It is also common to provide
training to the workers (Table 13D).
Nevertheless, there are some differences with respect
to the four aspects of labor policy of source of workers,
method of.. appointment, establishment of disciplinary
system and Chinese partners' attitude towards disciplinary
action among the different investment groups of joint
ventures when the primary data from the questionnaire
survey are consolidated into Table 22.
From the table, it is revealed that the four aspects
are closely correlated. Labor source of mainly from
original Chinese partner, appointment usually by the
Chinese partner alone, no disciplinary system and negative
attitude towards disciplinary actions are usually reported
simultaneously in the questionnaire. Such a policy has
been designated as Policy 1 in the present research
report.
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In addiion, policy 2- labor source mainly from
original Chinese partner or the Labor Service Bureau,
appointment mainly by the joint efforts of both the
Chinese and foreign partners, no disciplinary system or
disciplinary system under consideration, and negative to
neutral attitude towards disciplinary actions and Policy
3- labor source mainly from open applications or the
Labor Service Bureau, appointment jointly by both the
Chinese and foreign partners, disciplinary system
established, and a positive attitude towards disciplinary
actions are reported in the questionnaire survey.
Furthermore, Policy 1 is usually associated with
smaller joint ventures while Policy 3 is usually exhibited
by larger joint ventures (Table 23).
With the limited sample size, the correlation between
labor policy and total investment of the joint ventures
is studied. A chi-square test on the Hd hypothesis of
Labor policies are independent of the size of the joint
ventures is performed.
At the 0.05 level of significance, the H. hypothesis
is rejected, implying that labor policies are NOT
independent of the size of the joint ventures. Although
the observation is based on 26 responses only, it may
serve as an indicator, suggesting that future further
studies on joint ventures in China on the influence of
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labour policy by the size( in terms of total investment)
of the joint venture may be warranted.
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TABLE 22
CONSOLIDATED DATA ON LABOR SITUATIONS
A. SOURCES:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Originally from the
4 4Chinese partner 3
Referred by the Labor
IService Bureau 2 V 3
Selected from open
applications 0 1 10
6 8 16
B. APPOINTMENT
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than More than100,000-
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Solely by Chinese
4 34partner
1021Jointly
Solely by foreign
10partner
1475
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TABLE 22 (font' d)
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
No disciplinary
system 4 4 3
Disciplinary system
under consideration 1 2 2
Has disciplinary
system 0 1 9
5 7 14
D. CHINESE PARTNERS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS DISCIPLINARY ACTION:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Negative attitude 4 4 3
1Neutral 2 1
0 1Positive attitude 10
75 14
62TABLE 23
LABOR POLICY OF THE EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
A. DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR POLICY:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Policy 1 4 4 3
Policy 2 1 2 1
Policy 3 0 1 10
5 7 14
B. THE CHI-SQUARE TEST:
Ho hypothesis: Labor policies are independent of the
size of the joint ventures.
2
= 9.488
0.05
2
= 11.460
calculated
Conclusion: HO hypothesis is rejected.
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2.2.5 Quality Control
The acceptance of the quality control concept among
the Chinese partners and local workers varies significant-
ly from well accepted, reluctantly accepted, to completely
ignored (Table 16C). The primary data from the question-
naire survey also indicate that quality control in China
is usually performed by local staff (Table 16B). Consoli-
dating the primary data based on the total investments of
the joint ventures reveals that quality control measures
are well-accepted only in the large equity joint ventures
(Table 24A). A chi-square test on the H. hypothesis of
quality control is independent of the size of the joint
ventures confirms the observation. At the 0.05 level of
significance, the H. hypothesis is rejected (Table 24B).
Although the present sample size is limited, such a
finding may still reveal some significant insight into
joint venture operations in China. The statistical test
indicates that quality control may be a problem for the
smaller joint ventures in China.
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TABLE 24
CONSOLIDATED DATA ON QUALITY CONTROL CONCEPTS
A. ACCEPTANCE OF QUALITY CONTROL CONCEPT:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 1 L00,000- More than
100,000 1 L,000,000 1,000,000
Well accepted 0 0 7
Reluctantly accepted 0 1 4
Ignored 3 2 1
3 12
B. THE CHI-SQUARE TEST:
Ho hypothesis: Quality control is independent of the
size of the joint ventures.
2
Ik= 9.488
0.05
2fy--, = 12.500
calculated
Conclusion: Ha hypothesis is rejected.
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2.2.6 Organization Structure and Management
Responses on the total number of members in the board
of directors, the total number of departments, the number
of management levels, and the span of management are quite
consistent among the equity joint ventures surveyed. The
results have been tabulated in Tables 18A to D.
Nevertheless, differences in the organization
.structure and management style among the joint ventures
can be noted when the primary data on major decision
making level, use of organization charts and annual
budgeting 'are consolidated into Tables 25A to 25C.
It is also apparent that the smaller joint ventures
with total investments less than US$ 100,000 usually have
no organization chart, nor annual budgeting. Major
decisions are made at all levels (organization Mode 1).
From the survey, the majority of joint ventures with
total investments between US$ 100,000 and US$ 1,000,000
are at the moment considering the use of organization
chart and annual budgeting in their business. The major
decisions are usually made by top management (Mode 2).
Joint ventures with total investments exceeding
US$ 1,000,000 usually have organization chart and annual
budgeting and the major decisions are made by top
management only (Mode 3).
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The distribution of the three organization modes are
tabulated in Table 26A. Based on the 20 responses on
organization structure and management, the correlation
between size (total investment) and organization modes is
tested by the chi-square test using the H. hypothesis of
Management and organization modes are independent of the
size of the joint ventures. At the 0.05 level of
significance, the H. hypothesis is rejected (Table 26B).
Although the statistical test is performed using a limited
sample size, the finding indicates that organization
structure of joint ventures in China may be influenced by
the size (total investment) of the venture. Proper system
of organization management is found in large joint
ventures while the small joint ventures are more chaotic
in their organization and management.
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TABLE 25
CONSOLIDATED DATA ON ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
AND MANAGEMENT
A. ORGANIZATION CHART:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Has organization chart 0 1 9
Under consideration 1 1 3
Not necessary 3 2 0
4 4 12
B. ANNUAL BUDGETING:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
0 2 10Has annual budget
201Under consideratio:
023No budgeting
1244
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TABLE 25 (Cont' d)
C. MAJOR DECISION MAKING LEVEL:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (USS)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Board of Directors 0 i 9
General Manager/Deputy
General Managers 1 1 3
Department Heads 3 2 0
4 4 12
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TABLE 26
MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
A. DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHARACTERISTIC MODES:
Number of ventures in terms
of total investments (US$)
Less than 100,000- More than
100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Mode 1 3 2 0
Mode 2 1 1 3
Mode 3 0 1 9
4 4 12
H. THE CHI-SQUARE TEST:
H. hypothesis: Management modes are independent of
the size of the joint ventures.
2
= 9.488
0.05
= 12.000
calculated
H. hypothesis is rejected.Conclusion:
2
X
X
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2.3 Conclusions on the Questionnaire Survey
From the questionnaire survey, six major areas are
investigated: foreign exchange, joint venture laws and
regulations, infrastructure support, labor, quality
control, organization structure and management. With a
total reply of 33 respondents from the 125 sets
questionnaire, of which only 26 are useful, the sample
space of the study is limited. However, it is hoped that
the findings and statistical interpretations in this Chap-
ter may serve as indications and materials for further
study.
Based on the survey, it is concluded that most joint
ventures in China encounter problems in foreign exchange,
joint venture laws and regulations, and infrastructure. On
the other hand, labor policy, quality control, organiza-
tion structure and management are related to the size
(total investment) of the joint ventures. From the overall
perception and comments of the foreign investors in
Section IV of the questionnaire, bureaucratic red tapes,
better trained Chinese management teams, better labor
training, stronger disciplinary system, and less bureau-
cratic interventions are the major issues identified by
foreign investors on the areas of labor, quality control,
organization structure and management. These problems must
be solved by the joint efforts of the Chinese and foreign
investors if joint ventures in China are to be successful.
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CHAPTER THREE
CASE STUDIES
Two cases are studied in this chapter to highlight
the problems identified in Chapter Two. In the first
case, the General Manager of a joint venture in north-
eastern China was interviewed. The case is about the
salary reform in the joint venture.
In the second case, managers from a joint venture in
a Special Economic Zone in southern China were interviewed.
The case is an illustration of typical joint venturing in
China.
3.1 Case 1 Salary Reform, a Study on a Joint Venture in
North-Eastern China
The joint venture., started since January 1983, is
located in an industrial city in north-eastern China.
It manufactured electric goods with eighty percent of the
products produced being sold locally.
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The joint venture employed 75 Chinese workers and
four expatriate managers. Of the 75 Chinese staff, 70
were original employees of the Chinese partner. The
remaining five workers were employed through the Labor
Service Bureau. The foreign partner has proposed to use
the salary system that his company has adopted world-
wide. Discussions went on for more than one and a half
years before the new salary plan was approved in late
1984. The new plan was implemented in 1985.
While discussions were going on, workers in the
factory received a very low basic salary plus numerous
subsidies,' a salary structure typical of local Chinese
factories. The basic salary was low and related only to
the duration of the workers with their units. The salary
did not reflect achievements, nor efforts and contribu-
tions of the worke_ s to the factory.
The subsidies included meal subsidy, meat subsidy,
coal subsidy, non-staple food subsidy, housing and price
subsidy, and so on. The Chinese partner has already
carried out a salary reform before goiig into the joint
venture. The reformed salary system consisted of a
monthly bonus of about 22 yuans and a floating salary that
reflected the achievements of the employees. The amount
varied from 0.10 to 5.00 yuans. Only a handful of the
workers were qualified for the floating salary.
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3.1.1 The 1984 Salary
In 1984, before the approval of the proposed salary
scale, the joint venture workers were temporarily paid by
a salary system that was based on the reformed system.
The temporary salary system was formulated with the fol-
lowing items:
1. Basic salary
2. Coal subsidy
3. Non-staple food subsidy
4. Monthly bonus
5. Floating salary
6. 120 percent to the total of item 1 to 5.
7. Position allowance
In this transitional salary scale, only two subsidies
were included: the non-staple food subsidy of 5 yuans, and
the coal subsidy that varied from 0.30 to 3.80 Yuans.
All other subsidies were included in the basic salary
which varied from 38.50 to 113.30 yuans.
The monthly bonus of 22 yuans, and the floating
salary were maintained. The five items were totalled and
multiplied by a factor of 1.2. The salary for 1984 was
then completed by the addition of a position allowance.
The average salary on the 1984 scale was 106.85 yuans.
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3.1.2 The 1985 Salary Reform
The new salary plan as proposed by the foreign part-
ner was finally approved in late 1984, and was implemented
in 1985. A personnel classification system was intro-
duced. The system consisted of nine gradings. Grade 5,
the lowest grade, included cleaners, watchmen, and guards.
Grade 6 was set as an intermediate grade between Grade 5
and 7, and was left empty 4n 1985. Grade 7 included
operators, QC inspectors, warehousemen, cooks, and carpen-
ters. Grade 8 included technicians, skillful operators,
senior QC inspectors, mechanics, electricians, plumbers,
drivers, accounting clerks, securities, and marketing
executives. Grade 9 included senior technicians, senior
mechanics, senior electricians, production controllers,
secretaries, warehouse supervisors, assistant accountants,
personnel assistants, doctors, and canteen supervisors.
Grade 10 included supervisors for quality control, sales,
maintenance, accounting, and personnel departments. Grade
11 included shift supervisors and senior marketing execu-
tives. Grade 12 were quality control manager, material
manager, engineering manager, and product managers. Grade
13 was the production manager (See Table 27).
The 1985 salary scale was outlined in Table 28. The
salary. started with a 7 percent increase on the 1984
salary. If such an increase pushed the salary to an
amount above the highest level for the particular grading,
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the worker would only receive the 7 percent increase for
the year. If with the 7 percent increase, the salary was
still below the mean of the particular grading, the
worker's salary would be automatically increased to the
mean level. In addition, a performance rating of not more
than 10 percent increase was considered. The individual
salary was then rounded up to the nearest yuan. Figure 1
describes how the 1985 salary was computed from the 1984
salary. New workers started in 1984 with wages 50 yuans
or less would be automatically raised to the lowest level
of their grading. As a result salary increased from 7
percent to 39 percent for the old workers, to as high as
97 percent for the new workers. The average salary in
1985 was 123.78 yuans.
The system thus encouraged young workers to perform
well and discouraged old workers entrenched with old pro-
duction habits. According to a manager interviewed, old
workers were reluctant to discard their old habits, did
not follow instructions, and were too much occupied by
their old production methods. The management would not
hesitate replacing all old workers with new and young ones
who are willing to learn.
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TABLE 27
JOB GRADINGS
Grade Production Finance Personnel Marketing
13 Production Manager
12 Managers--QC, Material Product Managers
and Engineering
11 Shift supervisors Senior Marketing
Executives10 Supervisors--QC, Sales Financial Personnel
and Maintenance Supervisors Supervisors
Cost Accountants
9 Senior Technicians, Mech- Asst. Accountants Personnel Asst.
anics, and Electricians Doctors
Warehouse Supervisors Canteen
Production Controllers Supervisors
Secretaries
8 Skilled Operators, Drivers Accounting Clerks Security Guards MarketingMechanics, Electricians
Executives
Sr. QC Inspectors, Plumbers
7 Operators, QC Inspectors CooksWarehousemen
Carpenters
6
5
Cleaners, Watchmen
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TABLE 28
THE 1985 SALARY SCALE
a
Grade New Recruits Lowest Mean Highest
5 64.00 73.00 91.00 109.00
6 70.00 80.00 100.00 120.00
7 77.00 88.00 110.00 132.00
8 85.00 97.00 121.00 145.00
9 93.00 106.00 133.00 160.00
10 103.00 117.00 146.00 176.00
11 113.00 129.00 161.00 193.00
12 125.00 142.00 177.00 213.00
13 137.00 156.00 195.00 234.00
a
Starting salary for new recruits.
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1984 Salary
Raise 7%
Yes No
Higher Than
Mean?
No
Higher Than Bring To
Highest? Mean
Yes Add
Performance
Rating
Round Up To
Nearest Yuan
1985 Salary
FIGURE 1 FLOW CHART FOR THE COMPUTATION OF THE
1985 SALARY
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3.1.3 Further Reform in 1986
In 1986, the performance of the workers for the
previous year was evaluated. The 1986 salary increments
were then adjusted according to the performance evalua-
tions.
In 1986, the company further introduced an incentive
system which incorporated three criteria, namely: quality,
wastage, and volume. The quality target was a must and
had to be fulfilled. Spoilage target (target set to
minimize wastage) and volume target were set together with
the quality target. If the quality target was achieved,
the workers would get an additional bonus of 4 yuans. The
incentive bonus for the attainment of the spoilage target
or the volume target was 3 yuans each. If the volume
target was surpassed, a progressive incentive system for
each 5 percent increase in productivity was also laid
down.
The company obtains good result from the new salary
scale and incentive system. Productivity increases and
the workers are happy and cooperative. Wastage is mini-
mized and the joint venture is making profits.
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3.1.4 Analysis of the Case
The case highlights in detail the labor problems
facing equity joint ventures in China. The Chinese have
been proud of their salary system of low wages, high
subsidies which they claim is a special element of
their socialist system. With the open-door policy,
China is exposed to Western style management and salary
reforms are now recognised as essential and necessary.
The Chinese Government now understands that the so-called
economic wonders of no debts and no inflation are arti-
ficial. However, it would be very difficult for the
Chinese Government to bring, in one step, the suppressed
salaries and prices up to what they should be. As the
case illustrates, the current practice is to increase the
basic salary of the workers and to reduce gradually the
various kinds of subsidy. In the case study, only two
subsidies were included in the 1985 salary reform.
There is a gradual recognition that division of labor
is essential for a business entity to be successful.
Although the Chinese also classify their workers, techni-
cians, engineers, and cadres into gradings, the old philo-
sophy is that everybody-should work together. In the 1985
reform, the workers of the factory were classified into
nine grades, and some of them had to perform the roles and
functions of the supervisors.
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Perhaps the most important development in recent
years is the breaking up of the iron rice bowl policy.
As the manager in the case study reported, the factory was
willing and ready to replace undesirable workers. It is
reported that some old workers were unhappy about changes.
They were too tied up with old working concepts and
methods. They resisted new production methods and became
uncooperative. The joint venture was willing to have
these workers removed or transferred, and gradually re-
placing them with new workers who were willing and ready
to learn.
In the case, most of the workers were originally
working for the Chinese partner before the joint venture
commenced in 1983. The salary system initially used was
the reformed Chinese system. Although it was already a
reformed system,there were still deficiencies. The Chinese
partner took one and a half years to accept the more
performance-oriented system proposed by the foreign part-
ner. The Chinese partner worked together with the
foreign partner to appoint workers recommended by the
Labor Service Bureau. It would not be possible in the
past.
As a result of these new developments, the workers
are more productive and cooperative. The production tar-
gets are met with few delays. There is also a clearer
line of authority and responsibility. It is also reported
82
that the factory has designed job descriptions and speci-
fications.
Since the joint venture lumped the subsidies, bonus,
'floating salary' into one salary in the 1985 reform, an
incentive programme would be important. The joint venture
introduced a point system that graded the performance of
the workers. Good workers would get higher points and
bigger salary increments. They might also be rewarded
with faster promotions.
The egalitarianism concept is not easy to change. In
the original Chinese system, everybody knew each other's
salary. It would be very difficult to reward more produc-
tive workers with more incentives without making other
workers jealous. The joint venture enforces a very strict
rule: nobody is supposed to know others' salary, and
nobody is allowed to discuss his salary and to compare it
with others. Nobody is allowed to complain about his
salary. Anybody violating the rule would be subject to
disciplinary actions which may result in immediate dis-
missal without compensation.
The case also highlights the difference in philoso-
phies between the Chinese and foreign partners. As
discussed, it takes over one and a half years for the
proposed salary scale to be approved. It is not uncommon
that the two parties think differently and discussions
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go on without end. Patience and compromise are needed.
Understanding and cooperation are important to win the
Chinese partners over. Together with the foreign partner,
they would steer the joint venture through the bureaucrats
to the destination.
3.2 Case 2 Partnership, a Study on a Joint Venture Fac-
ory in a Special Economic Zone in Southern China
The factory being studied is a joint venture in a
Special Economic Zone in southern China,employing a little
over one hundred workers. The joint venture has entered
her sixth year of cooperation in 1987, and has become a
model plant in the food industry. However, six years ago
when the joint venture was still at her infant stage,
there were many problems.
3.2.1 The. Chinese Partner
To ensure a successful joint venture, the choice of
the right partners and the right personnel are of utmost
importance. Unfortunately, very often, the foreign part-
ners are left with little choice, since their joint ven-
ture partners are usually assigned. In the case studied,
the Chinese partner was assigned. When the joint venture
was initiated in 1981, the Special Economic Zone was just
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a small village. The factory assigned was the sole pro-
ducer of the products in the Zone. They had experience in
the manufacturing of the products, although the method of
production was comparatively primitive. The factory had
little experience in sourcing raw materials, and had prac-
tically no experience in marketing and sales. Neverthe-
less, the factory was the only partner available in the
Zone. Since the Chinese Corporation --the superior of
the Chinese factory, did not want a new competitor, the
Chinese factory was proposed to the foreign investor.
The foreign party accepted the offer. The agreement
was signed in early 1981 and the project commenced
immediately. Everything went smoothly. The foreign part-
ner continued to inject new efforts, ideas and investment
into the joint venture. A new factory building, a direct
electric power supply line, a direct water supply system,
and a waste water treatment plant were constructed. The
Chinese workers were very helpful, although their effici-
ency and effectiveness were both limited.
The new factory commenced commercial operations in
early 1982. Numerous problems surfaced. It was then
found that the operation costs were much higher than that
calculated in the feasibility study. During the study,
the costs of electricity and water were based on local
rates. The joint venture soon discovered that the rates
for electricity and water supply as charged by the local
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authorities were several times higher than the local rates
because foreign investments were involved, In addition,
the electricity bill was to be paid in foreign currency.
Then the salary payment was in dispute. It was
stated in the joint venture agreement that the salary
standard was HK$1,000 for the workers, $2,000 for the
supervisors, and $5,000 for the manager. The salary is
paid by the joint venture factory. The agreement also
included a fixed 10 percent annual increment on the wages.
The Chinese partner insisted that the joint venture
factory should pay the the Chinese workers in Hong Kong
dollars. *The Chinese partner would then convert the
money into Renminbi and pay the local workers. On the
other hand, the foreign partner's understanding was that
the Hong Kong dollar was just a standard. Since the
joint venture was generating local currency from local
sales, the salary for the local staff should be paid in
local currency. The argument went on for years and the
joint venture is still paying the Chinese partner in Hong
Kong dollars.
The workers did not receive the full amount of the
pay either. Although the joint venture laws state that
the workers should receive 70 percent of the salary,
workers in the factory received much less. A large pro-
portion of the salary was taken up by the parent Chinese
factory as welfare reserves. The Chinese Corporation
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also blocked and deferred applications for salary
reform. Finally, the new factory manager from the China
side took a daring move and by-passed his leadership and
handed the application directly to the Bureau of Labor
Affair. The application was approved. The average salary
in 1985 was increased to about 350 yuans. In 1987, the
average salary was further increased to about 500 yuans.
As a result, most workers of the joint venture have to pay
income taxes.
The salary reform reinforced the disciplinary system
that was established earlier in the joint venture. The
workers we're better disciplined. With reasonable salary
and strict disciplinary system, productivity had increased
by as much as 45 percent. The workers were more ready to
accept the quality control concept. High quality standards
were achieved and maintained. Wastage was kept to a
minimum. The factory had even received quality awards
from overseas.
3.2.2 The Foreign Exchange Problem
It was stated in the joint venture agreement that 20
percent of the production would be sold locally. However,
the two parties have different conceptions concerning
local sales. To the Chinese partner, since China was a
demander market, it was not necessary to set up a sales
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team. Customers demanding the products should go to the
factory directly, pay in cash, and collect the products
themselves. To the foreign partner, who foresaw future
competitions, marketing, sales, and distribution were
taken seriously. The foreign partner reckoned that a
sales team that could reach out to the customers was
essential. The products should be delivered and distri-
buted to the customers. The two partners had a long
argument on the topic. Eventually, a sales team was set
up in accordance with the foreign partner's conceptions.
The action was proved accurate. The products of the
joint venture faced strong competitions soon after.
The joint* venture was able to meet the competition
with the well-trained sales team, and sales volume actually
increased.
However, the more they sold, the more local currency
they received. Since most of the raw materials were bought
with hard currency, the joint venture faced a foreign
exchange balance problem. In addition, the Chinese part-
ner had little experience in sourcing. Most of the raw
materials were secured by the foreign partner. The for-
eign partner had tried to source in China. However, raw
materials in China were. exceptionally expensive. As an
example, one of the major ingredients produced locally
cost as much as two times higher than that imported. As a
result, only a few items were purchased locally. To solve
the foreign exchange balance problem, the joint venture
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tried to limit her local sales, to sell locally on foreign
currency, and to expand her export sales simultaneously.
The joint venture also began to invest in other business
that would generate foreign exchange and consume local
currency.
3.2.3 Foreign Involvement in Management
The foreign partner employed expatriate staff to
occupy key positions in the joint venture. Two of them
were stationed permanently with the joint venture factory,
while others travelled frequently from abroad to the
factory to offer managerial help. To enhance managerial
control of the joint venture, the foreign partner in-
creased the number of resident expatriates from two to
five in 1984.
The expatriates would also provide the necessary
training to the Chinese staff. Initially, the local staff
treated the expatriates with suspicion and were not con-
vinced of the management style they brought in, particu-
larly the disciplinary system. However, with the
imported management style, product quality improved and
productivity increased. The local staff are now ready to
accept the new management styles and methods. The
workers have become more disciplined and morale is high in
the joint venture.
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With the continual exposure to expatriate managers,
the Chinese partners became more understanding and
capable. Several Chinese managers have been transferred
from the joint venture to manage other factories. New
managers developed from the joint venture are capable and
willing to discuss with the expatriate managers. Better
communication and better understanding between the two
parties now make it easier for any difference to be sorted
out, making negotiations faster. Although there are still
some outstanding historical issues such as the salary pro-
blem, solutions are expected when higher authorities of
the Chinese Corporation and the Chinese Government are
convinced.
3.2.4 Analysis of the Case
The case serves as a very good example on the
problems confronting equity joint ventures in China from
the initial investigations to the day-by-day operation.
The case demonstrates the importance of a thorough feasi-
bility study before the signing of a joint venture agree-
ment. In the case, the estimated production cost has been
grossly miscalculated because the basic rates in electri-
city and water supply have been seriously under-estimated.
The situation also highlights the common practice of local
authorities imposing unreasonable charges and fees to
joint ventures. It is therefore prudent for the potential
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foreign investors to gather as much information as
possible from different sources before committing them-
selves in joint ventures.
The joint venture has to pay the electricity bill in
full in foreign currency. This is against Article 65,
item 3 of the Regulations for the Implementation of the
Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, which states that:
Fees charged for water, electricity, gas, heat, goods
transportation, service, engineering, consultation service
and advertisement etc. provided to joint venture, should
be treated equally with state-owned enterprises and paid
in Renminbi...for...products to be sold domestically.
The joint venture has 20 percent of her products sold
locally, and therefore should be entitled to pay 20 per-
cent of the bill in Renminbi. It was overruled by local
regulation that any enterprise with foreign involvements
should pay the electricity bill in full in foreign
currency.
The argument on the salary payment also reflects the
difficulties in implementation of the joint venture laws
and regulations. Many joint ventures have to draft their
own agreements. Such agreements could sometimes be vague
or in conflict with newly established laws and regula-
tions. This is especially true to some old joint ventures
that were formed when many joint venture laws and regula-
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tions were non-existent. As a result, arguments are like-
ly to occur. In the case study, the dispute on whether
the salary of the local staff should be paid in Hong Kong
dollars or Renminbi has dragged on for years. Good and
comprehensive laws and regulations are needed to avoid
such conflicts. Good and reliable arbitration are also
needed as many foreign partners are still in doubt of the
presence of non-biased arbitrators in China.
The workers of the joint venture were unable to take
home the 70 percent of their salary as stipulated in the
joint venture laws. This, together with the above-
mentioned problem on the electricity bill, highlights
the problem that the joint venture laws and regulations
are very often mis-handled, mis-interpreted, and sometimes
even ignored.
The salary reform of the joint venture highlights the
intervention of Government departments on joint ventures.
It is difficult to distinguish government officials and
corporation officials in China. More clear lines of
authorities are thus desirable.
The foreign manager of the joint venture in the case
study also commented that high calibre personnel are not
always available in China. Although they do exist, they
are very often assigned to other important posts. There-
fore, foreign investors need the confidence that they are
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able to transform their Chinese counterparts into capable
partners. The process would be time consuming but
rewarding.
The clashes in. values and differences in philosophies
between the Chinese and the foreign partners are apparent.
The setting up of the sales team is a good illustration.
It is only with patience and perserverance that any dif-
ference can be resolved. In the case study, after lengthy
discussions, the sales team was finally developed and was
able to face the growing competitions in the market place.
Foreign involvements in the management of the joint
venture are also important. It is only with continual
involvements from the foreign investors that the Chinese
staff are able to learn modern management style and
operation to the benefits of the joint venture. In the
case study, such modern techniques were finally
accepted by the local staff, and the enterprise begins
to prosper.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MAJOR PROBLEMS OF EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
Based on the information and data gathered from the
questionnaires (Chapter Two) and the case studies (Chapter
Three),major problems confronting equity joint ventures in
China are identified. In this chapter, these problems are
discussed in greater details.
4.1 Problems on Foreign Exchange
To many joint ventures, the foreign exchange problem
is the most critical problem affecting their operations in
China. Chinese officials admitted that nearly 70 percent
of joint ventures in Guangzhou are having difficulties in
earning enough foreign currency to recoup their invest-
ments, and to meet the cost of their foreign purchases.
It is also reported that more than one third of the one
hundred plus ventures in the Fujian province are facing
1
similar problems. A senior official of the Ministry of
1 The South China.Morning Post, Hong Kong, August 13,
1986.
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Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) commented
that most of the affected business are assembly plants
importing large quantities of components and selling
finished goods in China. While the joint ventures
accumulate Renminbi earnings, they have to find hard cur-
rency to purchase foreign imports, to remit profits, and
to repay foreign interests and loans. Numerous companies
with retail outlets in China also find that due to the
continuous shrinkage of China's foreign currency reserves,
they are unable to repatriate profits from domestic sales
as applications to convert Renminbi into foreign currency
are frequently turned down.
From the research study, it is found that many joint
ventures have the foreign exchange balance problem. Apart
from the 19 percent that does not take Renminbi and the 23
percent that needs more Renminbi to pay their expenses,
the remaining 58 percent has a surplus of Renminbi. All
joint ventures strive to-balance their foreign exchange
accounts. The Renminbi received are usually used for
paying wages and salary, locally purchased materials,
utilities, workers' welfare, and various other local
expenses. But as indicated in the second case study of
this business research study, some local bureaux, such as
the Bureau of Electric Supply, require the joint ventures
to pay the charges in foreign currency. Many local sup-
pliers are also demanding foreign currency when dealing
with joint ventures, or accepting only a portion of the
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payment in Renminbi. Even the Chinese partners may
request the joint ventures to pay the salary of the local
staff in foreign currency, as illustrated in the second
case study.
For the foreign partners, many of them remit hard
currency overseas by various forms including dividends,
loyalties, management fees, patent fees, or a combination
of the various forms. It is also revealed that most joint
ventures suffer losses because of interest expenses, dual
exchange rates, and Renminbi devaluations.
The Chinese Government is keen to maintain the well-
beings of foreign investment in China. In Article 73 of
the Regulations for the Implementation of the Laws of the
People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investments (July 1, 1979), it is stipulated
that:
All matters concerning foreign exchange for joint
ventures shall be handled according to the Interim Regula-
tions on Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic
of China and relevant regulations.
Article 75 of the Regulations states clearly that
the joint ventures must maintain the balance between the
receipts and expenditures of their foreign exchange. As a
favorable treatment to joint ventures, more flexible poli-
cies on foreign exchange controls have recently been
adopted. The provisions that all foreign currency re-
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ceived and drawn must go through the Bank of China are
waived. Joint ventures are allowed greater freedom in
utilizing their foreign exchange reserves. Pertinent
provisions or State approvals are not required for
expenditures in foreign currency. Joint ventures are
permitted to remit foreign currency abroad from their for-
eign currency accounts for the purchase of equipment and
materials, as a profit share of the foreign investment, as
salaries and wages to foreign staff and workers, or to
repay foreign exchange loans.
Despite the existence of such rules, joint ventures
still find' it difficult to remit foreign exchange abroad.
As China lacks foreign exchange and needs foreign funds
for her modernization programmes, joint ventures are not
always allowed to convert their profits in Renminbi back
to foreign currency. Thus they have to raise the necessary
foreign exchange they require. The situation is especial-
ly critical when foreign raw materials are required for
the operation of the joint ventures. The well known
examples are the Beijing Jeeps and the Fujian Hitachi.
The Beijing Jeeps Factory was forced to halt production
due to a shortage of foreign exchange. The problem was
not resolved until American Motors Corporation, the for-
eign partner of the Beijing Jeeps, threatened to leave the
country. In the Fujian Hitachi case, due to a shortage
of foreign currency, the production in 1986 dropped to
less than 60 percent of the peak level in 1984 (from
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337,500 sets of television in 1984 to 200,000 sets in
1986). Consequently, the profits of the plant decline
dramatically.
On the other hand, there are also successful cases.
The China Schindler Elevator Company Limited, a joint
venture formed among the China National Construction Mach-
inery Corporation, Schindler, and the Hong Kong based
Jardine Schindler Company, reported that the company is
able to balance the foreign exchange accounts, despite the
fact that most of the elevators are sold locally. The
venture imports only about 25 percent of the components,
and sales- are conducted partially in foreign currency.
Another joint venture, the Beijing Air Catering
Company, also conducts her sales primarily in foreign
currency. The venture earns enough hard currency to sus-
tain a high percentage of imported food and materials.
The venture is able to reward her investors in hard
currency. Therefore, if the joint ventures are able to
sell their products overseas, the magnitude of the foreign
exchange problem will be reduced significantly.
Another aspect of the foreign exchange problem is the
salary and wages remittance of the expatriate staff. The
Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the
People's Republic of China stipulates that foreign as well
as Hong Kong and Macau staff and workers may remit abroad
an amount in foreign currency of not exceeding fifty
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percent of their legitimate net earnings. A number of
foreign businessmen has complained of the implementation
of the provision indiscriminately to all foreign staff at
large. Some foreign staff have come to work in China
without bringing their families. Many are provided with
board and lodgings. Their expenditures in China would
thus be limited, and these expatriates should be allowed
to increase their foreign exchange remittance.
The foreign exchange problem is best summarized by
the statement of Mr. Zhu Rongji, Vice-Minister of the
State Economic Commission,
...The domestic markets are here, but there is no
foreign exchange for them to repatriate. The problem of
shortage of foreign exchange will be around for some
time. 2
2 The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, October 11,
1986.
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4.2 Problems on Joint Venture Laws and Regulations
Laws and regulations are vital to the maintenance of
order and to control the conducts and activities of indi-
vidual entities to the benefits and security of the
society at large. Joint venture laws and regulations are
particularly important as international elements are
involved. The laws and regulations should be based on the
principle of equality and mutual benefits. It is impor-
tant to the foreign investors that their rights and
security are observed, and that their investments are well
protected. To China, well-defined and properly imple-
mented joint venture laws and regulations would attract
international economic cooperation and technological
exchanges. Clause 18 of the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China states that:
The People's Republic of China permits foreign
enterprises and other economic organizations or indi-
viduals to make investments in China, or enter into
economic cooperation in various forms with Chinese enter-
prises or other economic organizations, as far as the
Chinese laws allow.
Article 2 of the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Joint ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Invest-
ments (July 1, 1979) also stipulates the aims and purposes
of the joint venture laws and regulations:
The Chinese Government protects, by the legislation
in force, the resources invested by a foreign participant
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in a joint venture and the profits due him pursuant to the
agreements, contracts and articles of association autho-
rized by the Chinese Government, as well as his other
lawful rights and interests.
All the activities of a joint venture shall be
governed by the laws, decrees and pertinent rules and
regulations of the People's Republic of China.
Therefore, the various joint venture laws and regula-
tions are aimed at achieving the following:
1. to establish the sovereign rights of China in joint
ventures-- all joint ventures are to be governed by
the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of
China.
2. to protect foreign interest in joint ventures, inclu-
ding:
a. Civil rights of the foreign investors. Article 14
of the Law states that:
Disputes arising between parties to a joint
venture ...may be settled through conciliation or
arbitration by an arbitral body in China or through
arbitration by an arbitral body agreed upon by the
parties.
b. Remittance of profits. It is stated in Article 10
that:
The net profit which a foreign participant
receives ...may be remitted abroad through the Bank
of China in accordance with the foreign exchange
regulations and in the currency or currencies
specified in the contracts concerning the joint
venture.
101
c. Establishing the power of the Board of Directors of
the joint venture. In Article 6 of the Law, it is
• stated that:
...The. Board of Directors, is empowered to
discuss and take action on, pursuant to the provi-
sions of the articles of association of the joint
venture, all fundamental issues concerning the
venture, namely, expansion projects, production
and business programmes, the budget, distribution
of profits, plans concerning manpower and pay
scales, the termination of business, the appoint-
ment or hiring of the president, the vice-presi-
dent(s), the chief engineer, the treasurer and the
auditors as well as their functions and powers and
their remunerations, etc....
Since the adoption and promulgation of the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investments, more than 300 economic laws and
regulations have been promulgated. These include regula-
tions on registration and administration of the joint ven-
tures, the implementations of the laws, labor management,
tax, accounting practices, and so on.
These additional laws and regulations are aimed at
further consolidating the principles of equality and
mutual benefits for both parties in the joint ventures.
They also reflect the spirit of the Chinese Government to
further liberalize the policies for the utilization of
foreign investments and the running of joint ventures. At
the same time, these laws and regulations also stipulate
nthPr preferential treatments to joint ventures including:
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1. Certain goods imported by the joint ventures are
exempted from customs duties and the industrial anc
commercial consolidated tax.
2. Joint ventures may be granted a reduction of or an
exemption from, upon approval of their application,
industrial and commercial consolidated tax for export
products produced.
From this research study, it is revealed that the
laws and regulations on joint ventures are far from per-
fect. From the survey, the majority of the respondents
maintains that the laws and regulations are very often
interpreted differently, or even being overruled by local
laws. The respondents also believe that their Chinese
partners, although they know the joint venture laws and
regulations, very often, just pick up what they want and
ignore the remaining laws and regulations that are protec-
ting the rights and interests of the foreign investors.
The uncertainty over current implementation of the laws,
or in some cases, the absence of laws, confuses the for-
eign partners.
It is anticipated that there would be different
interpretations of the laws and regulations from both the
Chinese and foreign partners in a joint venture. This is
inevitable as joint ventures in China bring together two
parties from completely different economic, political,
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social, and cultural systems. Owing to the wide and
deviated conceptions between the foreign businessmen and
Chinese businessmen/officials, different interpretations
are bound to take place. For example, disputes would
arise when the calculation on how much tax an operation
should pay is computed. Disagreements would arise over
the definitions and classifications on expenses, and the
types of provision a business could make. Another example
would be the income tax on foreign visitors staying in
China for 90 consecutive days and over. Some bureaux
insist that all visits should be aggregated unless there
is a 30-day gap between each consecutive visit. Other
officials treat each new entry into China separately.
Many foreign investors are also complaining of
bureaucratic feudalism. China is a centrally planned,
socialist economy. The entire administrative bureaucracy,
which governs virtually all facets of China's social and
economic life, is fragmented into hundreds of units
arranged into dozens of separate, vertical hierarchies,
forming a gigantic three-dimensional matrix divided by
industries, functions, and regions. All communications
are channelled vertically through local bureaux, or from
factories to central ministries. Horizontal communica-
tions between units from different ministerial hierarchies,
or across geographical boundaries in the same ministerial
hierarchy, are virtually non-existent. Each unit operates
as a semi-autonomous 'fief', responsible only to the imme-
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diate higher level in the hierarchy. Inconsistent or even
conflicting regulations from different bureaux and depart-
ments are not surprising. Each unit may have its own
agenda defined by its own interest. Thus, the customs
bureau may not be sympathetic to the foreign trade minis-
try's desire to grant favorable treatments to foreign
investors. The tax authorities may retroactively adopt
positions that undermine the financial viability of equity
joint ventures.
Frequent policy changes also plague investors. The
situations are exasperated by the fact that the myriad
internal circulars announcing changes are generally
unavailable to foreigners. Many local officials and
bureaux also regard Sino-foreign joint ventures involving
foreign investment as a cake that everyone should share.
It is reported in one case that a foreign investor who
received a duty-free clearance for his imported steel soon
discovered that it was a curse in disguise. He had to pay
1 percent of the steel's value to the tax deduction
3
agent for the paperwork claiming his exemption. Many
joint ventures are frequently requested to contribute
funds for building roads, bridges, and even parks.
As a result, 'connections' are important in mina.
Foreign executives soon find that there are more business
The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August,13,
1986.
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than mere business in China. One China trader with more
than seven years experience in a joint venture claimed
that most of his efforts are spent in 'non-productive'
activities such as entertaining people with influence.
Besides maintaining good relations with Government offi-
cials, it pays to be friends with people from the top to
the bottom. Rewards from such ostensibly unproductive
effort could be tremendous. The right connections could
bring cheap and reliable material supplies, tax conces-
sions, approval to sell goods locally or for exports, and
an attentive ear when problems arise.
4.3 Problems on Infrastructures
Infrastructures are important for industrial develop-
ment and modernization. The Chinese Government has noted
the importance of the issue. Mr. Li Zongtang, Vice Direc-
tor of the State Economic Commission, has the following
comments, To ensure the production of in-demand pro-
ducts, special arrangement will be made in the supply of
4
energy, raw materials, funds and transport facilities.
According to the figures from the Ministry of Elec-
tricity and Water Resources, China generated a total of
445.3 billion Kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1986, an
4
China News, January 6, 1987.
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increase of 9.4 percent as compared with 1985. But de-
mands for electricity increase even more, especially in
the coastal provinces. In Guangzhou, electricity inter-
ruptions occur three to four times per week. In Shanghai,
it is estimated that the city will be in short of two
billion kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1987. By 1990,
the shortage would be doubled.
Although many road systems and communication net-
works are constructed in recent years, the general con-
sensus maintains that there is inadequate infrastructure
support. In the survey, it is found that infrastructure
support is insufficient both in the set-up stage and in
the operation stage. The chi-square test on the data
obtained from the questionnaires shows that, irrespective
of the sizes and types of joint venture, infrastructure
support is a problem.
In a comment on problems in the Special Economic
Zones in China, Dr. Victor Sit, senior lecturer of the
Department of Geography and Geology, University of Hong
Kong, said that,
The open-door and decentralization policies are
undeniably correct. What went wrong was that China did
not have adequate infrastructure, and lacked quality
managerial personnel at the lower level, combining to
produce an unfavorable environment to implement the
policies. 5
The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August 15,
1986.
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Infrastructure projects are costly and risky invest-
ments, with little guarantee of adequate returns.
Although China has already tried her best to make the
conditions of such projects attractive, foreign investors
are still deterred by the huge investments required and
the long payback period.
The costs of infrastructures in Shenzhen and Hong
Kong are compared in a recent study conducted by Mr. S.C.
6
Tam. The results are reproduced in Table 29. The figures
indicate that apart from water, the costs of infrastruc-
ture in Shenzhen are in general higher than those in Hong
Kong. In addition, power interruptions are common in
Shenzhen. There are also inadequate telephone lines. All
these constraints have kept international traders away
from the major cities in the Chinese hinterland.
6
Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong, July 16 to 20, 1986.
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TABLE 29
A COMPARISON OF THE COSTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE
IN SHENZHEN AND HONG KONG
1. WATER AND ELECTRICITY COSTS: (Values in HK$)
Shenzhen Hong Kong
2.11/m0.675/mWater, Industrial usage
3 3
2 .11/m0.45/mWater, Domestic usage
Electricity, Industrial
0.6/unit0.925/unitusage
Electricity, Domestic
0.61/unit0.5/unitusage
(Values in HK$)2. TRANSPORTATION COSTS:
Hong KongShenzhen
1,000/month1,000/monthGasoline
1,500/year3,000/yearMaintenance
5,500/year5,500/yearLicense, Insurance etc
(Values in HK$3. COMMUNICATION COSTS
Hong KongShenzhen
Telephone Installation
6004,000Private
6006,000Office
48- 71125Monthly rental
Long Distance Charges
(first three minutes)
2.4/min.7.5/min.Hong Kong-Shenzhen
2.1/min.10.5/min.Macau
7.9/min.11/min.Japan
12.4/min.18/min.United States
Source: Wen Wei Po, July 16 to 20, 1986.
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4.4 Problems on Labor Force
Labor and staff quality is important to the success
of an organization. Owing to decades of socialistic mis-
indoctrinations, the labor force in China is, in general,
of low quality and unproductive. The legacy of radical
egalitarianism and the lifetime employment system result
in no incentive towards work. The iron rice bowl pheno-
menon is well-known to foreign investors. A tangle of
personal histories and ties, Party control over personal
issues, and the lack of an unemployment system result in
management having very limited leverage to make reforms.
The continuous boasting of full employment with an over-
population implies overstaffing and unproductive work
force.
In China, school graduates, except those who have the
chance to continue with their education in universities,
are assigned to various units by the State agency. The
graduates may state their preferences and make requests,
but they are not free to seek their own employment, or
change their jobs. Each factory or enterprise would
receive a number of school graduates and skilled techni-
cians. However, the factory managers are not free to hire
specialists. They have to train up their junior staff.
Applications for additional technicians may wait for
months or years at the state employment agency, and enter-
prises are not free to swap staff even if that would mean
putting the right people in the right jobs.
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Under existing regulations, school graduates cannot
apply for a new job until they have stayed in the assigned
posts for five years. If they quit, they will have to
remain unemployed for three years. Any factory that hires
them during this period would be liable to a 10,000-yuan
fine, and the director of the factory, 100-yuan fine. If
a factory employs a technician from another factory, the
former has to pay the latter the training costs of that
technician.
All these regulations make the Chinese workforce
highly immobile, sometimes to the point that they are
unable to' mobilize sufficient manpower to carry out the
much-needed reforms.
On July 26, 1980, China promulgated the Regulations
of the People's Republic of China on Labor Management in
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.
The following unique characteristics are noted:
1. The workers can be employed on contract terms.
"...A labor contract is to be signed collectively
by a joint venture and the trade union organization
formed in the joint venture. A relatively small joint
venture may sign contracts with the workers and staff
member individually.... (Article 2)
2. The joint ventures have the right to select their own
workforce.
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"The workers and staff members of a joint ven-
ture ...should all be selected by the joint venture
through examination for their qualifications....(Article 3)
3. The joint ventures have the right to take disciplinary
actions against their workers.
The joint venture may, according to the degree of
seriousness of the case, take action against those
workers or staff members whose violations of the rules
and regulations of the enterprise have resulted in
certain bad consequences. (Article 5)
4. The joint ventures are allowed to set the salary levels
within certain limits.
The wage level of the workers and staff members
in a joint venture will be determined at 120 to 150
percents of the real wages of the workers and staff
members of state-owned enterprises of the same trade in
the locality. (Article 8)
The wage standards, the forms of wages paid, and
bonus and subsidy systems are to be discussed and
decided upon by the Board of Directors. (Article 9)
Cheap labor is one of the major attractions for for-
eign investment in China. Labor cost per head is low.
Based on the survey data, the average salary of a worker
is 143 yuans, technical staff 205 yuans, and manager 260
yuans. However, labor cost per unit of output is rela-
tively high. For example, the Tianjian Winery, home of
Dynasty white wine, requires twice as many workers as
would be required in France. In addition, joint ventures
are bound by numerous regulations that stipulate them to
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provide their workers with pensions and allowances for
medical services, housing, and education. Table 30 shows
the estimate cost of a joint venture worker in Beijing,
assuming he earns a premium of 30 percent above the ave-
rage state-sector salary of one hundred yuans per month.
Although the take-home pay is 130 yuans, the joint venture
7
has to pay a total amount of 263.7 yuans. There are even
more outlandish cases in which the joint ventures are
levied by labor agencies and regional authorities to pay
up to five times the basic wage for various fees and
unnamed surcharges.
Despite the fact that joint venture workers are bet-
ter paid than the average Chinese workers, they may not
work as hard as the overseas staff. Incentive programmes
are therefore installed. Respondents from the survey
suggest that incentives such as bonuses, meals, tours,
prizes, and promotions are common.
A reasonable salary system, together with incentive
schemes, are found to be effective, as highlighted by the
two case studies in Chapter Three, in increasing pro-
ductivity and product qualities. Another development is
the adoption of the piece rate method. According to the
director of a towel factory, production went up tre-
mendously and workers' income rose by 30 percent. Some
The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August,
13, 1986.
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enterprises are also experimenting with a system that
links the wages to the profit levels. The Beijing Arts and
Crafts Corporation is trying out a system in which the
gross wages of the workers will be raised by 8 percent
when profits rise by 10 percent. Wages will be raised by
12 percent when profits rise by 15 percent. But the
Deputy General Manager has the following comments,
The system has worked very well because workers have
great incentives to be productive and efficient. The
problem is how to distribute the increased gross wages
among individuals. We want to give more incentive to the
more outstanding workers, but then others become jealous.
The concept of egalitarianism is too deep-rooted. 8
Training of workers is also common. From the survey,
it is observed that all joint ventures provide training
for their workers. Some train the supervisors abroad, and
then let the supervisors train the local workers. Others
bring in training teams or conduct on-the-job training.
It is found that joint ventures with enforcable discipli-
nary system perform better and have a better chance to be
profitable. Although the labor management regulations
have provisions for disciplinary actions, many overseas
businessmen are worried about the repercussions of firing
employees. Remy Nicholas, Remy Martin's Far East subsi-
diary and joint venture partner of the Tianjian winery,
finds it extremely difficult to sack sub-standard workers,
The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, November
10, 1986.
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"What happened in the past was that some lousy workers
left the winery for a month or so and then appeared
9
again. It is a matter of fact that many workers come in
through the 'back-door'. Such workers are difficult to
manage and at the same time difficult to fire.
According to Mr. Yan Yongqin, General Manager of the
Beijing Air Catering, a joint venture between the Civil
Aviation Administration of China and Maxim's, Dairy Farm,
and the Bank of East Asia, firing workers in China is a
long and laborious process.
...Our Chinese way of handling the matter is to give
many chances for the workers in question to rectify their
mistakes. Those who fail to improve will be demoted or
have their salary reduced. But they will not be fired
away....This is a marked difference from the Western style
of management, where workers will be fired just because
they are not up to the mark.... 10
Unemployment is a sensitive issue in China. If an
alternative job cannot be found for a problem worker, it
would be difficult to get rid of him unless he has commit-
ted criminal offences.
9, lUThe South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August
12, 1986.
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TABLE 30
COST OF EMPLOYING A WORKER IN A JOINT VENTURE
.IN BEIJING
Take-home pay 130 yuans
Housing and price
70subsidy
Labor insurance 2 6 (2 0 percents of pay)
26Pension fund
Medical expenses 9.75 (7.5 percent)
FrIiir'ati nn PXDPnse_s 1.95 (1.5 percent)
Total salary 2 6 3./ yuans
Source: The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong,
August 13, 1986.
116
4.5 Problems on Quality Control
Quality control is important if a joint venture
strives to enter the international market. Mr. Dale
Heathcote, Director and General Manager of the Dixons
Stores Group (Far East) Limited, when commenting on the
market potential of electrical and electronic consumer
items produced in China, said that the main hindrances
are the lack of recognition of the market requirements and
the long learning curve. Many products are not certified
safe by recognized laboratories, a necessary procedure for
products entering Britain. Dixons is the largest retailer
of electrical applicances in Britain and it has been
tapping supply sources in China for about two years.
Chinese manufacturers' unawareness of the overseas
markets is also reflected in their pricing. Mr. Heathcote
observed that sometimes the Chinese manufacturers merely
take the price of similar products made in Taiwan or South
Korea as reference, disregarding differences in design and
quality. Mr. Heathcote also noted that the time lag
between receiving the specifications and starting produc-
tion may be very long--18 months to two years as compared
against six months in.other Asian countries. The buyers
generally have to send engineers to China to explain the
specifications or offer assistance during production.
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Closely related to quality control is the availabi-
lity of raw materials supply. Mr. Robert Fisher, Vice-
president, International, of Borg Warner Corporation,
said,
We have been considering a plastics plant in Shen-
zhen for some time, but we would have to import materials
into China and would have to pay duty which makes it very
expensive. When the raw materials are available in China,
we will be ready. 11
The procurment procedure in China is tedious and time
consuming. Owing to 'bureaucratic feudalism', coordina-
tions and cooperations among different units are diffi-
cult. The supply, manufacturing, and marketing functions
are handled respectively by different units in the
hierarchy. Purchases of raw materials have to go through
various departments, connections, and distribution chan-
nels. It is not uncommon spending three to four months in
purchasing some simple raw materials.
In the research study, the chi-square test shows that
quality control is closely correlated to the profitability
of the joint ventures. When quality control measures are
well accepted by the Chinese partners and workers, the
joint ventures are more likely to earn profits. It is
reported that Fujian Hitachi has signed supply agreements
with more than 50 electronic manufacturers throughout
The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August iy,
1986.
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China. However, only about ten of them are able to turn
out parts that meet the factory's requirement. For those
parts that have achieved the necessary standards, the
prices are usually higher than the corresponding imported
components. The prices are artificially inflated by tax
and social welfare contributions for the employees. For
example, an imported color television tube costs about
US$45, while a TV screen from local suppliers costs more
than US$70! Mr. You Tingyen, the General Manager of the
joint venture,attributed the slow progress to the scarcity
and high cost of quality parts from local manufacturers.
The joint venture was in the red in 1986.
The Hangzhou Hotel, a joint venture of the Hong Kong
based Shangri-La International Hotel Management Limited,
Zhejiang Travel Service Corporation, and China Interna-
tional Trade and Investment Corporation, has a successful
story of establishing proper quality control. Mr. Wolf
Dieter Flecker, General Manager of the hotel, brings in
the more efficient, less forgiving management style from
the Shangri-La. Rules are established to prevent house-
keeping staff from merely running the broom over the floor
and calling the room cleaned waitresses from keeping the
guests waiting until they finish their conversation.
Employees of the hotel, some associated with the hotel for
over thirty years, have trouble in adjusting to the new
management and quality control.
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In addition, few employees are prepared to take up
the responsibility to supervise their colleagues. The
reluctance is the result of decades of socialistic philo-
sophy of diffused responsibilities and blames. The new
management and quality control measures call for close
supervision and control of a different kind, with managers
telling the staf what to do and ensuring that it is done
properly. A jump in wages helps to make the shocks easier
to absorb.
Instilling the proper attitude towards their jobs and
to the guests is another major concern of the hotel man-
agement and quality control. Mr. Flecker and his staff
members test out various methods to make local staff more
responsive to guests. A strict set of house rules is
established, including among other requirements, punctua-
lity, clean uniform, and no smoking on the job. Employees
breaking the rules are subject to reprimands and fines.
As a result of the improved quality, the joint venture is
performing well.
Remy Martin, the foreign partner of the Tianjin
Winery, has difficulties in controlling the grape growing
method. It takes a long time to persuade the Chinese
workers not to water the plants on certain days so as to
allow the sugar content of the grapes to grow. The
Chinese workers have, for years, followed their method of
growing grapes with 'successful achievements'. They are
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worried whether Remy Martin's method works. The quality
control and growing methods are finally accepted and the
Winery made a net profit of more than half million yuans
in 1986.
4.6 Problems on organization Structure and Management
Joint ventures bring together two completely dif-
ferent social, political, and economic systems. The
management styles and organization structures need careful
attention. Article 6 of the Law of the People's Republic
of China *on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investments stipulates that,
A joint venture shall have a board of directors with
a composition stipulated in the contracts and the articles
of association after consultation between the parties to
the joint venture, and each director shall be appointed or
removed by his own side. The board of directors shall
have a chairman appointed by the Chinese participant and
one or two vice-chairmen appointed by the foreign partici-
pant(s). In handling an important problem, the board of
directors shall reach decision through consultation by the
participants on the principle of equality and mutual bene-
fit.
The board of directors, is empowered to discuss and
take action on, pursuant to the provisions of the articles
of association of joint venture, all fundamental issues
concerning the venture,...
From the survey, the total number of members in the
board of directors ranges from four to ten, consistent
with Article 34 of the Regulations for the Implementation
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of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ven-
tures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment:
The board of directorscshall consist of no less than
three members. The distribution of the number of direc-
tors shall be ascertained--through consultation by the
parties to the joint venture-with reference to the propor-
tion of investment contributed.
The directors shall be-appointed by the parties to
the joint venture. The chairman of the board shall be
appointed by the Chinese participant and its vice-chairman
by the foreign participant....
The chairmen of the board of all the 26 joint ven-
tures surveyed are from the Chinese side, while the
general managers of the joint ventures are usually filled
by foreign expatriates (2.Q cases, representing 77 per-
cent).
It is worth noting the-comments made by Mr. Andrew
Chow, the Managing Director of Tianan Development Company
Limited. He believes that=.:t is unreasonable for China to
insist that the chairman df the board of a joint venture
must come from the Chinese side, and that the foreign
narty can only be the vice chairman.
...In Hong Kong and Taiwan, anyone who brings in the
capital will have the last-z--say over his investment. China
should not worry aboutFforeigners going against the
Government because investo=rs only want to make money in a
stable political environment. 12
12The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, December 5,
1986.
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On departmentation, all:-the respondents yield consis-
tent results with the total 'number of departments ranges
from four to eight for the majority cases. Only two
cases, representing eight percent of the population
studied, report that they have more than ten departments.
The survey also shows that almost all departmentations are
based on function. It is well known that Chinese opera-
tions are usually manufacturing oriented and are weak in
finance and marketing. The joint ventures surveyed
address the problem. Mr. W.H. Wong, Chief Beijing Repre-
sentative of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, has
the following comment:
Foreign investors should consider cooperating with
China to produce high technology products. China has
developed many practical and innovative products offering
wide scopes for cooperation----with foreign investors. But
China lacks the entrepreneur-al skills, market network, and
the means to mass-produce the products. These are the
areas where foreign partners can assist and help China to
develop. 13
A network of market information is slowly taking
shape in China. Miss Qien Xiuzen, Manager of the Beijing
Xin Xin Dress and Garments-Store, the biggest clothing
retail outlet in the city, reports,
We used to buy whatever the factories produce with
no regard to the people's needs and tastes. Because of
13 The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August 16,
1986.
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that it was hard to find the right sized clothes in
Beijing. 14
Miss Qien's staff has started to monitor the market
conditions, liaise with other stores, and place special
orders to factories. The biggest concern these days is
how to improve the design of clothing.
The most frequently encountered complaint in joint
venture organization and management is the lack of manage-
ment autonomy. Various laws and regulations on joint
ventures have stipulated that the Chinese government
bureaux and ministries are responsible only for guidance
and assistance to joint ventures. The relationship be-
tween these departments and the joint ventures should not
be the leadership relationship that exists in state-owned
enterprises. For example, Article 33 of the Regulations
for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic
of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investments stipulates that, The highest authority of
the joint venture shall be its board of directors. It
shall decide all major issues concerning the joint
venture.
However, deep-rooted 'bureaucratic feudalism' is
still affecting many joint ventures. Chinese officers of
many joint ventures still have the tendency to report to
14 The South China Mornin Post, Hong Kong, November
10,1986.
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the related leading bureaux and ministries, which some-
times do issue orders and directives without notifying the
foreign partners.
There is also the problem of unclear authority.
Article 6 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investments
states that,
Unless otherwise stipulated, the Government depart-
ment in charge of the Chinese participant in a joint
venture shall be the department in charge of the joint
venture. In case of a joint venture having two or more
Chinese participants which are under different departments
or districts, the departments concerned shall consult the
district to ascertain one department in charge.
The regulation provides only the general principle.
Criteria to ascertain the department in charge are not
given. As a consequence, there are cases when two or more
departments are fighting each other to lead a joint ven-
ture. On the other extreme, there are also cases when no
department would like to take up the responsibility when
advice and clarifications are requested.
Settlement of disputes is another problem area.
Article 14 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investments
states that:
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"Disputes arising between the parties to a joint
venture which the board of directors fails to settle
through consultation may be settled through conciliation
or arbitration by an arbitral body of China or through
arbitration by an arbitral body agreed upon by the
parties.
The provision is vague and many foreign parties are
sceptical about the composition and practice of the
Chinese arbitral body.
The survey reveals that foreign managerial involve-
ment is limited almost to top management only. If China is
to learn from the West the modern management and organiza-
tion techniques, the Government should encourage more
foreign participations in the various managerial levels.
The objectives of joint ventures-to learn advanced techno-
logy and modern management from the developed countries,
would then be fulfilled.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSIONS
The major problems confronting joint ventures in
China are not uncommon. Foreign investors are frequently
complaining, in some cases, quite bitterly, about the
problems. If China wants to attract more foreign invest-
ment, the problems identified in Chapters Two, Three and
Four must be addressed and solved without delay.
5.1 The 22 Articles
In July 1986, the State Council launched a strategic
move to restore the confidence of foreign investors. The
State Council instructed various ministries and regional
governments to study ways to ensure the success of foreign
investment projects. At the same time, the State Council
took a full investigation into the grievances of foreign
investors. The move demonstrated Beijing's recognition of
the problems and wills to remove these obstacles
threatening joint ventures. These studies, covering major
investment centers, confirm the difficulties of doing
business in China.
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In October 11, 1986, the State Council promulgated
The Provisions of the State Council of the People's Repub-
lic of China for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment,
commonly known as The 22 Articles. The 22 Articles are,
in general, being accepted to be lubricants oiling the
gears of investment. No one, including the Beijing autho-
rities, believes that they would solve all the problems.
Foreign bankers, traders, and investors are anxious to see
whether the promises will be fulfilled. 1987 will be the
year for testament.
Many investors have expressed reservations on the
Articles. Mr. Gu Ming, China's top legal official and
Director of China's Economic Legislation Research Center,
admits that the 22 Articles are 'loosely worded'. He
regrets that there may be loopholes because of the short
preparation time. But Mr. Gu also suggests that it is a
prompt action at a critical moment: It would have been
too late if we hadn't released the 22 Articles in
1
October. We couldn't afford any delay.
The 22 Articles provide enterprises involving foreign
investment with more preferential treatments in areas such
as payment of taxes, labor costs, land-use fees and other
charges. The Articles also allow such enterprises full
1 The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, December
30, 1986.
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autonomy in management including recruitment and dismissal
of workers and senior managerial personnel.
The 22 Articles are encouraged by China's senior
leader, Mr. Deng Xiaoping, and the Prime Minister, Mr.
Zhao Ziyang. Mr. Deng assures that the problems of high
operating costs, and the lack of managerial decision-
making power would be addressed and solved. In an inter-
view with Mike Wallace, a reporter of the American tele-
vision programme 60 Minutes Plus, Mr. Deng said, No
foreign investors would come to China if they had no hope
2
of making a profit.
Two types of enterprise are particularly encouraged
in the 22 Articles. They are the export oriented enter-
prises, and enterprises with high technology. Export
oriented enterprises are enterprises that generate surplus
foreign exchange after profits are remitted overseas for
the foreign investors in the joint ventures. Enterprises
with high technology are enterprises that possess imported
advanced technology, or devote to developing new pro-
ducts, or up-grading existing products. The major provi-
sions of the 22 Articles are discussed in the following
sections.
2
The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, November
10, 1986.
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5.1.1 Laws And Regulations
Article 16 calls for a stronger control over indis-
criminate levy of charges and allows enterprises the
rights to refuse unreasonable charges:
All districts and departments must implement the
'Circular of the State Council Concerning Firmly Curbing
the Indiscriminate Levy of Charges on Enterprises'. The
people's governments at provincial level shall formulate
specific methods and strengthen supervision and adminis-
tration.
Enterprises with foreign investment that encounter
unreasonable charges may refuse to pay and may also appeal
to the local economic committees up to the State Economic
Commission.
Article 17 deals with red tape and 'bureaucratic
feudalism' and calls for efficient work processes.
The people's governments at all levels and relevant
departments in charge shall strengthen the coordination of
their work, improve efficiency in handling matters and
shall promptly examine and approve matters reported by
enterprises with foreign investment that require response
and resolution. The agreement, contract and articles of
association of an enterprise with foreign investment shall
be examined and approved by the departments in charge
under the State Council. The examination and approval
authority must within three months from the date of re-
ceipt of all documents decide to approve or not to approve
them.
Special preferential terms are granted to export
oriented enterprises and enterprises with advanced techno-
logy. In Article 8, it states that after the expiration
of income tax exemption and reduction, the income tax rate
of an export oriented enterprise shall be reduced from the
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original rate of 30 percent to 15 percent, provided that
70 percent or more of the total value of the products are
exported. The income tax rate for enterprises in special
economic zones, economic and technological development
zones, or enterprises already paying income tax at 15
percent rate, shall be reduced to 10 percent under the
same provisions. Enterprises with advanced technology are
already exempted from income tax for the first two profit
making years. After that they enjoy a three-year income
tax reduction of 50 percent. Article 9 extends the grace
period of tax reduction for another three years.
Article 4 reduces the site use fees except those in
central areas of big cities. The fees are limited to five
to twenty yuans per square meter per annum in areas where
development and site-use fees are computed and charged
together. In areas where the land development fees are
computed and charged on a one-time basis, and in areas
where enterprises are undertaking land development them-
selves, the site use fees are limited to three yuans per
square meter per year.
5.1.2 Foreign Exchange
Article 14 allows enterprises with foreign invest-
ments to mutually adjust their foreign exchange surpluses
and deficiencies with the supervision of the foreign
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exchange control departments. It also allows such enter-
prises to obtain cash security services and loans in
Renminbi from the Bank of China and other designated
banks.
Article 6 stipulates that the Bank of China will give
priority to export oriented enterprises and enterprises
with advanced technology in granting loans for short-term
revolving funds, and other needed credits.
5.1.3 Labor
The 22 Articles highlight some remedies and solu-
tions to the labor problems. Article 15 allows enter-
prises with foreign investment the rights to determine
wage levels, forms of wages, bonuses, and allowances. It
also stipulates that:
...Staff and workers who violated the rules and
regulations, and thereby cause certain bad consequences,
may, in accordance with the seriousness of the case, be
given differing sanctions, up to that of discharge....
Article 3 exempts the enterprises from paying subsi-
dies except labor insurance premiums, welfare costs, and
housing subsidies. The article reduces labor costs con-
siderably.
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5.1.4 Infrastructure
Article 5 stipulates that export oriented enterprises
and enterprises with advanced technology will be given
priority in the supply of water and electricity, and uses
and assess of transport and communication facilities. The
Article also stipulates that: Fees shall be computed and
charged in accordance with the standards for local state
enterprises. The Article reduces infrastructure
charges considerably.
5.1.5 Quality Control And Raw Materials
Article 15 allows the enterprises with foreign
investment the rights to work out their production and
operation plans. Article 13 simplifies the procedures for
importing equipments and materials needed for production:
Machinery and equipment, vehicles used in produc-
tion,raw materials, fuel, bulk parts, spare parts, machine
component parts and fittings (including imports restricted
by the State), which enterprises with foreign investment
need to import in order to carry out their export con-
tracts do not require further applications for examination
and approval and are exempt from the requirement for
import licenses. The customs department shall exercise
supervision and control, and shall inspect and release
such imports on the basis of the enterprise contract or
the export contract....
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5.1.6 Organization Structure And Management
Article 15 guarantees the autonomy of enterprises
with foreign investment:
The people's government at all levels and relevant
departments in charge shall guarantee the right of auto-
nomy of enterprises with foreign investment,... Enterprises
with foreign investment may, in accordance with their
production and operation requirements, determine by them-
selves their organizational structure and personnel
system, employ or dismiss senior management personnel,
increase or dismiss staff and workers. They may* recruit
and employ technical personnel, managerial personnel and
workers.
5.2 Development After The 22 Articles
Since the promulgation of the 22 investment incen-
tives in the Provisions of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of
Foreign Investment, regional authorities have shown tre-
mendous goodwills and spirits of cooperation. Foreign
businessmen may probably have less to worry if regional
authorities continue to act with the same sense of urgency
and understanding as displayed in the months since the
release of the 22 Articles. The expediency with which
many cities and municipals improved efficiency and slashed
charges has been widely reported by the Chinese media.
Nearly all open cities have held meetings to design their
own measures to implement the 22 investment incentives.
134
The Chinese Government has set up a special body to
handle foreign investment. The government body is headed
by the State Councillor, Mr. Gu Mu. Many cities followed
and set up special service centers. To improve effici-
ency, open cities have set up offices headed by mayors or
governors, which, in concert with the economic, legal, and
customs departments, aim at making quick decisions. The
following is some recent developments which occur in dif-
ferent parts of the country.
5.2.1 Guangzhou
Up to December 1986, nine manufacturing joint ventures
have been named as technically advanced enterprises, and
are therefore entitled to generous tax benefits under the
new incentive scheme. The nine includes the Peugeot Truck
joint venture and the Guangmei Food venture between
Beatrice Company and China. Also included are ventures
producing items such as household applicances, medicine,
cement, and containers. More will be announced in the
near future after the city has completed her screening
process.
On the criteria of classifying 'high technology'
enterprises, Mr. Zhang Zhiyuan, Deputy Director of the
Guangzhou Commission of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade, has the following comments,
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"We prefer to be lenient in our criteria to encourage
foreign investments. We won't attempt to compare the
technique of our joint ventures with others in the
Northern cities. 3
Mr. Zhang reported that the city deems enterprises
as high technology if the technology is more advanced than
that of existing enterprises, if their products are better
than other enterprises, or if their products can subsiti-
tute imports.
In addition to advanced enterprises, Guangzhou city
officials also named 14 joint ventures as export-oriented
by December 1986. These 14 joint ventures are entitled to
the generous benefits under the 22 Articles. To supplement
the 22 Articles, The Guangzhou City Government has also
drawn up a set of implementation guidelines:
- Guangzhou can exempt both export oriented and advanced
technology joint ventures from the 10 percent local tax.
- Joint and cooperative ventures in Guangzhou, after
approval from the Bank of China, can issue stocks or
hnnds in the city to raise funds.
Exporters and advanced technology joint ventures will
enjoy a preferential land use fee of 2.5 yuans per
3 The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, November
28, 1986.
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square meter per year if their operations are located
outside the business hub.
5.2.2 Beijing
In November 1986, certificates entitling joint ven-
tures to preferential treatment by the Beijing Municipal
Government were issued to 24 technologically advanced and
export oriented enterprises. Mr. Chen Xitong, the Mayor
of Beijing stated that,
We will firmly carry out the regulations of the 22
Articles to make a better market for foreign investment.
Joint ventures will enjoy more autonomy from now on to
make profits. 4
5.2.3 Dalian
The authorities in Dalian have announced the fol-
lowing changes to cut costs for foreign investors:
- Lower land usage fees. Foreign enterprises using advan-
ced technology or exporting more than 60 percent of
their products can apply for exemption from land usage
fee for five years.
The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, November
21, 1986.
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Foreign investors will pay the same public utility
charges for electricity, water, and gas as state-owned
enterprises.
- Lower labor charges. Insurance premium for local
Chinese employees of foreign enterprises is to be fixed
at 20 percent of their basic salary, compared to the
previous 25 percent.
- More tax holidays. Foreign enterprises exporting the
bulk of their products, using high technology, or in-
volved in long-term projects will be exempted from
paying local tax for seven years. Foreign investors are
also allowed to pay their tax in Renminbi. Previously,
many had to pay in foreign currency.
Depreciation schedules will be changed to allow faster
write-offs.
Construction and engineering fees levied on foreign
investors will now be the same as those for state
enterprises.
5.2.4 Fuzhou
The Fuzhou Municipal Government has listed lb incen-
tive measures to attract foreign investments and to
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protect the interests of foreign investors in the city and
in her economic and technological development zone:
- Export oriented and technologically advanced ventures
involving foreign investment inside the zone will be
exempted from site development and land use fees for
five to ten years. At the same time, the fee was also
set at five yuans per square meter per year.
Water and electricity supplies to ventures with foreign
investment will be charged at the same rate as state-
owned enterprises. Rents for factory premises have been
reduced to 50-70 yuans per square meter per annum, and
rents for houses, to 400-500 yuans per square meter per
annum. Property rights are now transferable.
- A center would be set up in the economic and technolo-
gical development zone to offer consultancy services to
foreign investors and to act as an agent for personnel
training, manager sourcing, raw material and equipment
procurement.
A raw material supply company and a consultation com-
pany would be set up to assist the coordinatory body.
Foreign investors would be able to file their complaints
and have the rights to refuse unreasonable charges.
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Government authorities would be instructed to speed up
the application process for new projects. Approvals or
rejections would be notified within 30 days after
receiving the required documentations.
5.2.5 Shanghai
After the promulgation of the 22 Articles, foreign
exchange centers and service centers are set up in Shang-
hai to offer consultancy services to foreign investors.
Government authorities are instructed to speed up the
application process for new projects. Establishment -of
enterprises with foreign investments will be approved by
the Shanghai Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commis-
sions. Approval or rejection of project proposals will be
notified within 30 days. Within another 30 days, the
contract documents would be approved. Final approval cer-
tificates would be issued within 10 days, making the
total duration from application to final approval to less
than 70 days.
5.3 Critiques And Actions
The developments are impressive and encouraging.
However, many foreign investors remain critical and ex-
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press reservations about the package. Elements of the 22
Articles are considered to be ambiguous and vague. Such
feelings are understandable and shared by Chinese offi-
cials when Mr. Gu Ming, China's top legal official admits
that the 22 Articles are loosely worded. The 22 Articles
cannot, and will not solve all the problems. It would
just be a road sign pointing towards success. In addition
to the 22 Articles, more should be done to alleviate the
problems confronting the equity joint ventures in China.
5.3.1 Laws And Regulations
From the questionnaire survey of this business study,
most foreign investors are concerned that the laws and
regulations are sometimes interpreted differently, and in
some cases, the Chinese partners just pick up what they
want. Mr. Gu Ming, Director of China's Economic and
Legislation Research Center, admits the problems, and
suggests that the uncertainty over current laws, or in
some cases, the absence of laws, is the root of such
problems and complaints.
To solve the problems, a comprehensive legal frame
work for economic activities is planned within the current
five-year plan. The new laws would cover cooperative
joint ventures, special ventures, special economic zones,
corporate law, securities, banking, and foreign trade.
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More than ten laws related to foreign trade and
investments are planned for 1987. These would be among
the 160 laws that the Central Government plans to enact
within 1987 in a move to expand foreign economic rela-
tions.
Concerning the legal activities in China, Mr. Gu Ming
has the following comments:
China has formulated more than 300 economic laws
since 1978. Many are aimed at promoting joint ventures
and other businesses involving overseas investment...
China is accelerating the pace of personnel training to
help implement laws and statues... The number (of law-
yers) is too few (20,000), compared to some 700,000
lawyers in the United States. 5
One important aspect should be noted. Following the
directive regulations from the State Council, many cities
and provinces have issued their own regulations. Despite
the goodwills of the moves, rules issued by various autho-
rities are likely to confuse foreigners. The State
Council should standardise fees and charges through
national regulations rather than leaving them totally in
the hands of the regional authorities. The present situa-
tion whereby different places levy different charges is
confusing. Various departments should be restricted in
issuing their own regulations relating to foreign invest-
ment. And it is recommended that foreign investors
D
The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, November
29, 1986.
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should be directed to the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade (MOFERT) for the most authoritative
interpretation in cases of inconsistency in regulations.
Banning government departments from levying unreason-
able charges is important. Foreign investors have com-
plained about the large number of service and construction
charges levied by Chinese authorities, thereby pushing up
their costs tremendously, causing conflicts and problems.
The practice of sucking the foreigners dry must be
prohibited if China is to encourage foreign joint ven-
tures.
In addition,the establishment of coordinating centers
is desirable. Such centers can be established at both
central level and regional level. The centers could
settle problems arising from crossed involvements of dif-
ferent ministries, departments, and/or regions. The
centers can also help forge links between foreign and
local organizations and improve Sino-foreign economic
relations. The main tasks of such centers may fall into
the following areas:
- to coordinate local enterprises in their dealings with
foreign enterprises.
to establish contacts with foreign organizations, firms,
and enterprises and to assist foreign organizations in
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overcoming difficulties that may arise in their dealings
with Chinese enterprises.
• to help government departments in settling disputes
between Chinese and foreign enterprises.
- to provide information and consultation services to
foreign enterprises.
• to study international economic situations, positions of
foreign enterprises, and to recommend policies towards
various foreign enterprises.
For the foreign enterprises, it is recommended that
they monitor closely the developments of Chinese economic
laws and regulations. Since the Chinese legislative
system is still at her infant stage, it is to the benefits
of the enterprises to keep abreast of the newest develop-
ments. This would keep the companies from possible
entanglements in legal problems, and enable them to obtain
benefits from new offers by the Chinese Government in the
shortest possible time.
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5.3.2 Foreign Exchange
The foreign exchange problem is perhaps the thorniest
problem in China today. In January 1986 the Chinese
Government stepped in. Joint ventures were then allowed
to pool their foreign exchange needs, to sell 'approved'
products in China for foreign exchange, to export other
'approved' Chinese products in lieu of the joint venture's
production. Such arrangements did not bring in much
incentives for foreign investors as they found the mea-
sures difficult to implement and expensive. It is diffi-
cult to convince potential Chinese buyers to buy made-in-
China high-technology products with their scare foreign
exchange.
Article 14 of the Provisions of the State Council of
the People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of
Foreign Investment makes further attempts to tackle the
problem, and suggests that foreign investors can mutually
adjust their foreign exchange surpluses and deficiencies
among themselves. The Chinese Government would also set
up centers to supervise such activities. According to
the Chinese authorities, in 1985-86, a trade volume of
four to six millions US dollars was recorded.
However, many foreign investors have doubt about the
usefulness of such arrangements. It is suggested that the
scheme could be successful in business such as hotels and
the service industries. Many joint venture hotels and
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restaurants accept only foreign exchange certificates.
These establishments would therefore need Renminbi to pay
their Chinese staff and workers, and to purchase locally
supplied materials. Theoretically, they need to buy Ren-
minbi using foreign currency. However, many establish-
ments have their own ways of obtaining the necessary
renminbi.
In order to balance the demand and supply of foreign
exchanges, the following recommendations are suggested:
1. Renminbi reinvestment
The method is what the Chinese Government highly
recommends, Joint ventures with Renminbi profits are
recommended to reinvest in other business. The 22
Articles outline such an encouragement. Joint ventures
reinvesting in export oriented enterprises and techno-
logically advanced enterprises would obtain tax bene-
fits in the form of refund of income tax already paid.
However, the Chinese Government has to further clarify
the offer. Will the refunds be in foreign currency?
Will the Chinese Government arrange hard currency loans
- cz„r-h rpinvestments?
Foreign investors already investing in China would
have better marketing and sourcing knowledge, and
would be able to consider reinvestments in vertical or
horizontal integration.
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2. Compensation trades and cooperating ventures
Compensation trades are trading opportunities in
which the Chinese parties repay the equipment supplied
by the foreign parties with the products produced. In
cooperative ventures, the equipment could be owned by
the foreign party or jointly owned. The products will
be supplied at ex-factory price until the cooperative
terms expired.
Nathan Rothman, Managing Director of Trade Inter-
face Corporation, United States of America, has the
following comments:
0ur company realizes the opportunities that the
Chinese market offers to American producers and what
the American market offers to Chinese producers. By
promoting the flow of products both ways, we promote
friendship. 6
TIC sells advanced equipment to Chinese enter-
prises to up-grade their production capacity. In
return, the company markets the products so produced
back in the United States. Compensation trades
arranged by TIC help the Chinese enterprises, espe-
cially those of small and medium sizes, to resolve
their foreign currency problems on importing equipment
and production lines. TIC has successfully introduced
the Huanan beer brewed in Guangzhou to the American
mnYUo+- This beer is selling in the United States at
VThe South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, November,
21, 1986.
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the same price as Tsingtao beer and some famous Euro-
pean brands. Customers are willing to pay the price
because of the improved taste and the attractive pack-
aging introduced by TIC. From September 1985 onwards,
the company is importing five containers of Huanan Beer
per month. The supply is unable to meet the American
demand. The sales volume for 1987 is expected to
surpass the two million US dollar mark.
General Motors Company also devises a plan for
their joint venture to export parts to generat foreign
exchange earnings for the purchase of imported kits.
Making use of the already available technical personnel
in China, the company develops a programme to make
twist drills for the American market.
3. Diversified investment
Foreign investors can plan their investments in
China with different ventures or lines of business.
Volkswagen, when started a joint venture to
manufacture automobiles in Shanghai, also operated an
engine plant. The engine plant was designed for export
and the foreign exchange so generated would be used for
the imported parts for the automobile factory. Pepsi-
Cola International, after several years of operations
in China, diversified into the fast food business to
consume their accumulated local currency.
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4. Use of local parts and materials
Most joint ventures and investors have attempted
to use local parts and materials. However, most of
them are encountering great difficulties. They find it
very difficult to secure the right sources, and the
materials and parts supplied may not be up to the
quality requirements and are expensive. As Fujian
Hitachi Television reports, the joint venture has
signed supply agreements with more than 50 electronic
suppliers throughout China. Only about ten are able to
turn out parts that are up to the required quality, and
the price tag is in general higher than if imported.
Similar phenomena are reported by the Beijing Jeep
Company, the China Schindler Elevator, and many other
joint ventures.
The Chinese Government should rectify the situa-
tion by banning arbitrary pricing from local suppli-
ers and offer assistance to local manufacturers to
produce quality and price-competitive components. The
pricing bureaux should supervise the pricing policies
of suppliers, and should revise unreasonable pricing
policies. The banks in China should arrange the neces-
sary financial assistance to suppliers to improve their
product quality.
5. Barter trade and import substitution
In barter trade, the foreign investors are offered
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products to trade-in the equipment. The products
offered in exchange need not be produced by the trade-
in machinery. However, special provisions for barter
trades may not be granted unless the products and/or
technology are not available in China.
If the products of the joint venture can be
classified as 'import substitutes', they would be given
priority when Chinese enterprises purchase such pro-
ducts. However, such arrangements are difficult to
make or to implement because Chinese enterprises are,
very often, unwilling to buy made-in-China products.
China has a .long history of dual exchange rates.
In 1979, the country created the Foreign Exchange Cer-
tificates. Controls in foreign exchange are necessary,
but they should not be too extensive. According to
Professor Harold Crookell of the University of Western
Ontario, the foreign exchange 'crisis' in China is not
7
a crisis at all by international standard. It may turn
out to be a one year aberration in the country's ordi-
narily conservative foreign exchange policy. Such
conservative policy imposes extra foreign exchange risk
on the equity joint ventures. To solve the foreign
exchange problem, China should relax her policies by
7
The Hong Kong Manager, February/March 1987: pp. 8-17
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allowing higher debt-equity ratios, and guaranteeing
foreign investors the right to repatriate their
initial foreign exchange investment when the venture
has made a large enough profit.
5.3.3 Labor
The labor problems of low productivity, poor
labor quality and management are common to joint ventures
in China. Although Article 15 of the 22 investment incen-
tives provides a general guideline,more should be done to
tackle these problems.
1. Productivity
Although China is proud of her low labor costs, the
actual labor expenses in China are not cheap. The salary
that the workers receive is low, but other expenses such
as commissions to the labor agencies, insurance, and other
subsidies may amount to more than what the workers re-
ceive. Together with the low productivity of the workers,
the labor costs per unit output becomes very high. China
should discard the iron rice bowl policy, set up
unemployment agencies, provide training courses for the
unemployed, and create more job opportunities.
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2. Labor quality
Some workers are undeniably less disciplined, slow in
actions, and very often, irresponsible. Because of China's
long isolation many workers are not atoned to modern
production methods and ideas. Besides incentive pro-
grammes that are offered by joint ventures and foreign
investors, the Chinese Government should also improve the
education system, set up more vocational schools as well
as technical colleges, and instil proper working attitudes
into the local workers.
3. Labor management
To enhance staff and labor management, reforms in
employment system are necessary. Enterprises should be
allowed to advertise for staff. The practice of employing
workers through the back-door should be discouraged. The
'iron rice bowl' policy should be broken up to make way
for disciplinary systems. The feudalistic concept that the
enterprise owns the workers should be discarded so that
workers can look for better opportunities.
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5.3.4 Infrastructure
The lack of infrastructure supports is a difficult
problem. As discussed in Chapter Four, investments
for infrastructure projects are huge and few foreign
investors are willing to invest in them. Government
investments in infrastructure developments are therefore
essential. Careful central plannings are necessary, as
evidence shows that infrastructure development in China is
not able to meet the needs of her industrial development.
China should regard adequate infrastructure supports as a
prerequisite to encourage foreign investment into the
country.
In fact, China is heading towards such a direction.
It is reported that China plans to invest 15 billion yuans
in launching 41 key projects along the Yangtze River in
the new five-year plan, doubling the amount in the last
five years. Most of the money will go to the expansion
and construction of port facilities along the river.
Berths capable of receiving 5,000 tons sea-faring vessels
are planned for Wuhan and the Huangshi Port of Hubei, the
Jiujiang Port of Jiangxi, and the Wuhu Port of Anhui.
Also planned are one hundred small and medium-size berths
capable of handling 40 million tons cargos per year.
Moreover, 34 dangerous shoals and under-water rocks, a
total of 1.36 million cubic meters, will be removed, five
water channels improved, and eight sunken ships salvaged.
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Along the Yangtze River, new telecommunication faci-
lities will also be installed. These will include 21 VHF
coastal stations and four telecommunication centers, and
1,748 kilometers of micro-wave digital telecommunication
lines from Shanghai to the Yichang City of Hubei.
At the same time, China plans to construct 28 power
stations to serve the coastal cities and ports. These
stations, planned for completion by 1990, will be able to
generate a total of 120 million megawatt-hours of electri-
city per year. The first batch of generators will go into
operation by mid 1987. It is hoped that these stations
will be able to ease the severe power shortages impeding
the economic development of these cities.
5.3.5 Quality Control and Raw Materials
Good quality assurance measures, secured raw material
and components supplies are vital factors to the success
of joint ventures in China. Good quality assurance pro-
gramme ensures high-quality products. It also reduces
spoilage and hence the product's unit cost. Good quality
assurance makes production efficient and effective.
The Chinese Government shares such a sentiment as Mr. Li
Zongtang, Vice-Director of the State Economic Commission,
stresses that all enterprises should attach great import-
ance to their products' quality, and that such quality
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should be up to the national and international standards.
The followings are some recommendations for a quality
assurance programme in China:
1. An incentive programme can be of great value. Owing to
low wages, incentive systems are particularly useful in
China. Joint ventures can set up quality targets such
as spoilage limits, cost reduction targets, and so on.
Workers achieving such targets should be properly
awarded.
2. Foreign involvement in the quality assurance programme
is desirable. Foreign investors can bring in expertise
in quality assurance and help introducing the quality
concepts to the local staff and workers. The question-
naire survey in this study also points to such a direc-
tion.
3. The acceptance of quality control by the Chinese part-
ners and workers is also important. It is only with
whole-hearted acceptance and supports from Chinese
leaders and workers that a quality assurance programme
can be carried out successfully. In the survey, it is
found that 61 percent of the respondents reports that
the Chinese workers only accept the quality control
measures reluctantly or ignore the quality concepts
completely. The Chinese Government should provide
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adequate training to their workers, and should instil
the concept of quality into them.
At the same time, joint ventures in China should use
as many locally made components as possible. Sources and
supplies of local materials and components are important.
The material and components must be of the right quality,
at a competitive price and must be able to be delivered on
time. The Chinese enterprises must avoid arbitrary
pricing. Many Chinese officials and leaders still regard
foreign investors as exploiters, who are only concerned
with making big profits for themselves. The concept of
equality and mutual benefits must be maintained, and the
Chinese enterprises should supply their products at rea-
sonable prices to the joint ventures. The Chinese enter-
prises should also conduct marketing research and acquire
up-to-date quality standards and specifications.
For the foreign investors, it is important that they
should secure local raw material and component supplies
before entering into joint ventures in China. If local
suppliers are not available, due account must be made to
estimate the amount of imports necessary.
5.3.6. Organization Structure and Management
From the questionnaires, it is found that joint ven-
tures that are better organized with stronger involvement
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from top management and the board of directors are more
profitable. To effect such a management model, the joint
venture must be granted sufficient autonomy, the board of
directors should provide strong leadership, and more for-
eign managerial involvement should be encouraged.
1. Autonomy
Both the joint venture laws and the 22 Articles
uphold that the autonomy of joint ventures should be
respected. However, most of the chairmen and managers
from the Chinese partners usually hold other official
offices and are responsible to other ministries, depart-
ments, corporations, or the parent factories. Such com-
plexity in roles makes autonomy of joint ventures easier
said than done.
Autonomy also means allowing the factories a free
hand to handle their products. As a means to encourage
exports, competent factories should be allowed to handle
their own exports instead of going through the state
trading agents. It would enable the factories to have a
better idea of the market demands and speed up product
improvement. The present rigid foreign trade system
creates a serious gap between the trading agents and the
production units. This is because the trading agents are
only responsible for reaching the export targets while the
factories are responsible for fulfilling the production
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targets. Communication between these units are lacking.
.With full autonomy, joint ventures would come out with new
management ideas, intensify market surveys and information
networks, and make their products more competitive on both
domestic and international markets through technological
advancement.
2. Management syster
Many Chinese enterprises are now testing out new and
improved managerial systems. One such 'test point' is
held in Chongqing, one of China's biggest inland indus-
trial cities along the Yangtze River. The management
system under test is called 'Asset Management Responsi-
bility'. Bidders for the position of factory director have
to submit plans and predictions on the factory's ability
to deliver profits to the State. The winner would be
delegated the full control over planning, administration,
personnel recruitment, pay, and dismissal. The manager
who is able to meet his profit targets and boost the
firm's capital assets would be rewarded. On the other
hand, if the combined profits and asset values decline,
the manager would be subject to salary cuts or dismissal.
The Chinese managers in joint ventures could be appointed
on such similar lines.
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3. The board of directors
The- board of directors, as stipulated in the Law of
the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using
Chinese and Foreign Investments, is the highest level of
authority of the joint venture. Pursuant to the provi-
sions of the articles of association of the joint venture,
the board of directors is empowered to discuss and take
actions on all fundamental issues affecting the venture.
The duties of the board of directors should cover the
following categories:
1. To review and approve annual budgets and annual per-
formance plans of the joint venture.
2. To discuss and set down the general guidelines, duties,
and regulations within the joint venture such as salary
structure, welfare systems, disciplinary systems, staff
handbooks, and so on.
3. To lay down basic organization structure of the joint
venture to hire and arrange key personnel within the
joint venture.
4. To undertake strategic planning. The board of direc-
tors should initiate and manage the strategic planning
process. A long-range view should be taken by the
board in order to specify the corporate mission of the
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joint venture, to delineate her corporate objectives,
and to formulate appropriate strategies and policies.
Together with the top management team of general
managers, deputy general managers, the board of directors
should manage the joint venture efficiently and effective-
ly. Depending on the involvements of the board of direc-
tors and the top management, there could be four types of
management, namely,
1. Chaos Management, where involvements from both the
board and the top management are low.
2. Entrepreneurship Management, where involvement from the
board is low, but involvement from the top management
is high.
3. Marionnette Management, where involvement from the
board is high, but involvement from the top management
is low.
4. Partnership Management, where involvements from both
the board and the top management are high.
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For the particular situations in Chinese joint ven-
tures, partnership management is most desirable. It is
only with an effective and intensive involvement from both
the board of directors and top management that a joint
venture can prosper in China. As the questionnaire survey
reveals, there is a definite relationship between partner-
ship type management and the chances of profitability of
a joint venture. Hence, an effective board of directors
is indispensable.
The followings are some recommendations for setting
up an effective board of directors:
1. The board of directors should be stable and be kept
'intact'. The number of members should be maintained
constantly. Any retirement or resignation of the board
member should be replaced immediately to ensure the
board continues to function without undue interruptions.
2. Members of the board must be capable. It is a practice
in many cities to assign board membership to various
city officials. Such practice should be stopped.
Assignments should be given to members who are able to
devote their time and energy to the joint venture. Any
figurehead must be removed from the board of directors.
3. The board of directors is the highest authority of a
joint venture. Therefore, it should be granted full
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autonomy and should not be required to report to the
city authorities, departments, and/or corporations for
instructions and guidelines. A joint venture is a
separate entity and should be responsible for its own
actions, profits and losses.
4. Expatriate involvements
Expatriate involvements in various levels of manage-
ments are helpful and desirable. It is well-known that
Chinese partners could be very good at manufacturing and
production, but weak in finance, sourcing, marketing, and
personnel managements. Expatriates can offer help in
these areas if they are involved in the management of the
joint ventures.
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CHAPTER SIX
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STARTING
JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA
Six major areas of concerns are identified in the
present business research study. They are foreign ex-
change, laws and regulations, labor, infrastructures,
quality control and raw materials, organization structure
and management. These are important factors and must be
tackled successfully if joint ventures are to be
profitable.
Joint ventures are not easy. It is especially so in
China due to her long isolation with the outside world
and the fact that joint ventures in China have less than
ten years of history. Like marriages, joint ventures are
to be built on mutual trust and respects. As one analyst
said,
Although the Westerners are superior to the Chinese
in terms of technology, they should try to respect their
Chinese partners. The best thing is to win your Chinese
partners to your side. They can guide you through the
bureaucracy and help you source raw materials. 1
1The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August 12,
1986.
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Although there could be misconceptions, the Chinese
themselves recognize the existence of these problems and
are trying to carry out suitable remedies to solve the
problems. Foreign investors should not wait until all
these problems are resolved. Potential investors should
work hard and do the necessary preparatory work. In the
following section, some suggestions for entry preparation
are discussed.
6.1 Entry Strategies
The major objectives of entry strategies are to re-
duce or avoid problems that might arise when the foreign
partner makes his moves to approach the Chinese market.
The China entry strategies consist of two components: eco-
nomic analysis and strategic structuring.
6.1.1 Economic Analysis
Economic analysis identifies every possible economic
pitfalls in the proposed business plans before investment
takes place. In the analysis, the three sectors of the
entire business system, namely, sourcing, manufacturing,
and marketing, should be studied. Systematic screenings
and/or decision tree analyses are used to focus on criti-
cal issues.
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6.1.2 Strategic Structuring
Strategic structuring is an approach to solve
critical issues identified from the economic analysis.
Three distinct stages of strategic structuring may be
involved:
1. At stage one of strategic structuring, an alliance of
Chinese units would be developed. These Chinese units
should have complementary capabilities in the sourcing,
manufacturing, and marketing areas. The prime objec-
tive of the stage one structuring is to ensure the
economic viability of the venture. Issues such as high
unit cost, problems on foreign exchange balance,
restricted market accesses, and so on, are addressed at
this stage.
2. At the second stage, the relationship between the new
venture and the Chinese partner(s) would be developed
in such a way that the new joint venture can possess
the maximum autonomy and that the conflicts of inter-
ests between the venture and the Chinese partner(s)
would be minimized. The prime objective of this stage
of structuring is.the avoidance and/or reduction of
conflicting objectives.
3. The final stage of strategic structuring involves
formulation of the organization structure of the joint
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venture. It focuses on issues such as the relationship
among the board of directors, the general manager, the
deputy general manager, and the department heads the
composition of the board and the selection of the
general manager. The prime objectives of this stage
are to reduce bureaucratic interference and strengthen
internal management. It focuses on attaining maximum
autonomy with respect to personnel policies and the
appointment of managers.
6.1.3 Tactics to Entry Strategies
To realize the entry strategies, special tactics are
advocated as follows:
1. Business analysis
Analyse the nature of the business to identify
whether the critical factors of success rest on
sourcing, manufacturing, or marketing.
2. Organizational analysis
Analyse the Chinese system to identify and under-
stand the relationships amongst the potential players,
including sourcing, manufacturing, marketing and dis-
tribution
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3. Capability assessment
Assess through informal channels the capabilities
of each sector of the business system. Particular care
should be given to the critical success factors. For
example, if marketing is critical, determine who has
the greatest marketing capability.
4. Bottom-up approach to candidate selection
Identify potential partners through 'informal
means. Make informal approaches to test their capabi-
lity and availability proceeding to higher levels
when reasonable consensus are attained. The reason of
avoiding direct approaches at the ministry level is to
avoid locking in to the Minister's agenda.
5. Viability negotiations
Conduct negotiations in two distinct phases. In
the first phase, the negotiation should focus on the
feasibility study with emphasis on the economic viabi-
lity of the business plan. The financial proforma
model should be prepared jointly. The goal is to
converge on a common vision of the project. The key is
to convince the Chinese to apply economic criteria
rather than pure technical criteria, so that both
parties can focus on solving the basic economic issues.
After the viability negotiations, conduct con-
tract negotiations. Documents should be drafted to
embody the business plan agreed upon.
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6. Transition to start-up:
Project visions and consensus should be streng-
thened. At the same time, joint ventures should try
to extend and lobby the project vision among relevant
bureaucracy.
6.2 The Challenge
Joint venture in China is a challenging business.
Joint ventures mean to venture together. Like a marriage,
it is built on trust, faith, and mutual understandings.
As the general manager of the second case study remarks,
China ventures are frustrating and problematic. But when
you find rooms for manoeuvring, it is fun.
168
APPENDIX 1
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
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QUESTIONAIRF
This is a questionaire especially to the foreign partners of
joint ventures in the Peoples' Republic of China. The purpose
is to investigate the problems faced, solutions seeked, and
opinions of the senior executives concerning the organization
structure and operations of the joint venture.
In the questionaire, please indicate the most appropriate
answer (s) with a tick(). The answers will be treated with
strict confidentiality and will be used solely for the research
report only.
Thank you for your time and assistance.
PART I GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Country of origin:
[ ]Hong Kong and Macau Japan USA
[ ] Europe Other
2. Area of business:
[] Manufacturing Services [] Trading
[] Mixed Others
3. History:
First negotiation
Agreement reached
First commercial operation
4. Profit sharing formation:
Year to: China% Foreign%
Year to: China% Foreign%
Year to: China% Foreign%
Year to: China% Foreign%
Expiration: Date[] Renegotiate [I Turn over to China
5. Capital formation:
In monetary terms: In asset terms:
Foreign China Foreign China(USS) [] [ ] [ ][] Land10,000 below
Building10-50,000
Technolog]50-100,000
Machinery100-500,000
Other500-1,000,000
1M-5M
5M over
6. Annual Revenue in US$ (for the last financial year):
[] 50, 000 & below[] 50-100,000[] 100-200,000
[] 200-500,000[] 500-11000,000[] 1M-5M
[] 5M-10M[] IOM above[] Not in operation
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7. Making profits?[] Yes [] No, expect in 19
8. Do you have large amount of RMB in reserve?
[] Yes, we have a large surplus 'in RMB
[] We have a few RMB but not much
[) We take no RMB[) We need more RMB
9. Use(s) of RMB recieved: (May tick morethan 1)
[] Pay for wages/salaries[] Pay for local materials
[] Pay for utilities[] Pay for local expenses
[] Expand present operation[] Workers' welfares
[] Re-invest[] Export Chinese goods
(] Loan to needed parties[] Saving in bank
[] Convert to hard currency and remitted overseas
[] Others
10. Besides dividends, do you remit profit in the form of:
(May tick more than 1)
[] Loyalties[] Patent fees[] Transfer pricing
[] Management fees[] Others
11. Do you suffer any losses due to: (May tick more than 1)
[] Dual exchange rates[] RMB devaluation
[] Interest expenses incurred because RMB received cannot
be converted immediately and have to borrow hard currency
[] Others
12. You have tax holidays for years, tax reduction_ ears.
13. Market:
China Rest of China % )Export (Local
14. For goods sold in China, currencies received:
[] RMB [I Hard currency [I Both
15. Distribution of goods produced:
[] Only locally[] Within province[] In big cities
[] A few provinces and cities[] Whole country
16. Supply/Demand
[] Demand is high, but sales limited by regulations/agreement
(] Demand is high, but sales limited by capacity
[] Demand is high, but sales limited by transportation
[] Demand is high, but sales limited by back-up services
[] In equilibrium[] Supply in surplus
17. Price compared with similar local products:
[] Lower, by_%[] Same [I Higher, by
% % %
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18. Advertizements of goods produced[] Allowed[] Not allowed
19. In your opinion, how is the Chinese Joint Venture Laws
executed?
[] It is well-observed
[] It is sometimes over-ruled by some local laws
[] It is sometimes interpreted differently
[] It is not followed
20. Do you think that your Chinese partners know the Joint
Venture Laws?
[] Yes, they do They pick up what they want
[] No, they don't I have no ideas
21. In your opinion, what are the- reason(s) for your company to
into joint venture with PRC: (May(May tick more than 1
Vast China market[] Regional market (Asia)
Cheap labor[] Close to raw materials supplies
Goodwills[] Technology transfer to China
Industry not allowed in other countries
Technical expertise possessed by China
Others
22. Total number of Employees:
5 Below 6-10 11-50
51-100 101-200 201-500
501 and above
No. of Expatriates:
OPERATIONSPART II
1 mime taken to set un the business operation:
Ready for use MonthsTakeElectricity Supply
Ready for use Take MonthsWater Supply
Ready for use Take MonthsLand Formation
MonthsReady for use TakeBuilding
Take MonthsReady for useRoad Systems
MonthsTakeReady for useTelephone Lines
MonthsReady for use TakeEM Installations
2. Are there any major delays during operation set up?
[] yes, about times[] No
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3. Reasons for delays: (Mav tick mnra than 1
Changes in design[] Delays in inland freight
Delays in equipment and machinery shipment
Delays: in Custom procedures[] Delays in utilities
Delays in dock unloading[] Accidents
Others
4. Did you bring in outside labors for the initial set-up?
[] Yes[] No, only provide supervisions to local labors
5. Is the joint venture in full operations?
[] Still under negotiation[] Under construction
[] Commissioning test run [I Up to% capacity
[] Full capacity (1 2 3 shifts)
6. How often does the joint venture operate in 2 shifts?
[] All year round[] In peak months[) Never
7. How often does the joint venture operate in 3 shifts?
[] All year round[] In peak months[] Never
8. Training of workers:
[] No training required
On the job training
[] Training with a training team
[) Train supervisors abroad and let them train up local
workers
[] Train operators abroad
9. Wages Salary Structure:
Ordinary Technical Managers
Workers Staffs
HK$HK$Salary/Wages paid (average) HK$
RM BRMB RMBActually received
RM BRMB RMBBonus
Pd4 BRMBRMBOther Subsidies
10. Incentive (s) Offered: (May tick more than 1)
[] Annual increments in salary/wages, average
[] Bonus: Average RMB High RMB
[] Meals: [1 2 31[] Housing
[] Medical[] Prizes
[] Tours[] Promotion
[I Campaigns[] Others
11. Is there any disciplinary system?
[] Yes[] No[] Under consideration
12. Are there any disciplinary actions taken?
[) Yes [I No[] Under consideration
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13. Chinese partner's attitude on disciplinary actions?
[] Positive [] Negative [] Neutral
14. Sources of local workers/staff:
[ Refered by the Labor Service Bureau of China
[1 Original workers/staff of your Chinese partner
[ Selected from open applications
15. Appointment of staff/workers:
Jointly [] Solely by Chinese partner
[] Solely by foreign partner
16. Is there any worker/staff came in through the .back-door?
[) Yes% [] No
17. Do you use time-clock and/or job-cards?
[] Yes [] No [] Under consideration
18. Scheduling ability:
[] All schedules are met
[] Schedules are usually met with a few delays
[] Schedules are usually not met
[] There is no scheduling at all
19. Major problem(s) on scheduling: (May tick more than 1)
[) Raw materials delays[] Maintenance problems
[] Inadequate workers' skill[] Working attitude ethics
[] Insufficient supervision[] Bureaucratic blockages
[] Others
20. Is there any Quality Assurance Department or similar
sections in your organization?
[] Yes [I No[] Under consideration
21. What kind of quality control measures do you have?
[) On line[) Of f line[] Both
22. How does your quality control measures accepted?
[] Well accepted[] Reluctantly accepted
[] Ignored[] Rejected
23. Quality Assurance is handled by [l local or() expatraites
24. In your opinion, quality control of the joint venture is
[] Up to standard[] Acceptable H More have to be done
25. Computerization:
[] No[] Little[] Extensive
26. If extensively computerized, in what area? (May tick more
than 1)
[] Design[] Manufacturing[] Accounting
[ Payroll[] Communication[] Others
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27. Maintenance:
Do you have to call in outside maintenance teams?
[] Yes, about times a year.
[] No, performed by locally trained workers.
28. The outside maintenance teams usually have problems in:
(May tick more than 1)
[] Bringing in necessary tools[] Bringing in necessary parts
[) Traffic and communication [I Accommodations
[] Language barriers[] Others
[] No problems at all
29. Do you have any problem in spare parts supplies?
[] A lot[] A few[] No
30. Major problem(s) about spare parts? (May tick more than 1)
[] More parts consumed than anticipated
[] Procedures in obtaining new parts
[] Parts purchased sometimes don't match
[] Difficult to repair used parts
[] others
31. Do you have any problem in power supply?
[] Often[] Sometimes [I No
32. Do you have your own stand-by power?
[] Yes [I No[] Under consideration
33. Do you have any problem in water supply?
[] Often[] Sometimes [I No
34. Do you have your own water reservior?
[] Yes [I No[ J Under consideration
35. Do you have any problem in raw materials supplies?
[) Often[] Sometimes[) No
36. Refer to the above question, if the answer is often or
sometimes, the main problem(s) are:(May tick more than 1)
[ Quality [I Delivery [I Transportation
[) Purchasing procedures[] Import procedures
f1 Others
37. Do any of the supply problems affect operation?
[] Not at all[] Little[] Serious
38. Raw material supplies mainly from:
[ China[ 1 Import[] Both
39. Taking everything into account, the unit cost tui pct Cu
with industrial average in Asia is:
[j Higher [l The same[] Lower
40. Comparing with your home country, unit cost is
[] Higher[] The same[] Lower
175
PART III ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT
1. Number of members in the Board of Directors:
China: Foreign:
2. Chairman of the Board:[] China[] Foreigr
3. General Manager
[] China[] Foreign[] Third party
4. Assistant General Manager(s)
[] China[] Foreign_[] Third party
5. Does the joint venture have an organization chart?
[] Yes[] In progress
[] Under consideration[] Not necessary
6. Departmentation according to:
[] Functions [] Product lines[] Locations
[] Mixed
7. Number of departments:
8. Number of management levels:
9. Span of management (The maximum numbers of subordinates
or departments supervised by a manager):
[] Less than 3[] 4 to 10[] 11 to 20
[] more than 20
10. Does the joint venture have any problem in the present
organization structure?
[] Yes[] Not at the moment[] No
11. If' Yes'. what kind of problem (s)? (may tick more than 1)
[] Not enough mutual consultations
[] Not enough understanding on China side
[] Not enough understanding on foreign side
[] Not enough understanding on both sides
[] Line of authority unclear
[] Others
12. Level of computerization:
[] All departments[] Main departments
[] Individual departments[] Not commenced yet
[] No plans
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13, The first department (s) to employ computer (s): (May tick
more than 1
[] Finance [] Quality control [] Marketing
H] management Information g [] Inventory control
[] Personnel [] Others
14. Percentage of employees capable of using computers:
15. Major decision making by:
[] All levels [] Department heads
[] Assistant General Manager [] General Manager
[] Board of Directors
16. Organization changes:
[] No changes [] Minor changes [] Often, times
17. Reason (s) for changes: (May tick more than 1)
[] Expansion [] Computerization
[] Contraction [] Technological innovatic
[] Management reform [] Changes in leadership
[] Simplification of organization [] Others
18. Does the joint venture have annual budgets:
[] Yes [] No [] Under consideration
19. Foreign managerial involvment in joint venture:
[] Top level. only [] Top and Middle [] All levels
20. Foreign managerial involvment by functions: (May tick
more than 1)
[]Strategic plannings [] Marketing and Sales
[]Finance [] Technical
[) Personnel [] Others
21. In your opinion, the present organization is running:
[] Well [] Quite well [] Fairly well
[] Not very well [] Poor
22. In your opinion, the joint venture can be considered as:
[] Extremely successful [] Successful
[] Not very successful [] Failure
[] Too early to comment
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PART IV
YOUR OVERALL PERCEPTIONS AND COMMENTS
1. The followings are two sets of numbers representing present
status and trends of your local work teams. Please choose
your answer by circling
Present Status Trends
1= Bad, poor etc 1= Improving
2= Below average 2= The same
3= Average 3= Getting worse
4= Above average
5= Good
Present Status Trends
1. Productivity [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
2. Efficiency [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
3. Quality Assurance [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
4. Maintenance [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
5. Wastage [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
6. Workers' Attitude [1 2 3 4 5) [1 2 3
7. Safety Attitude [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
8. Technical Ability [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
9. Planning Ability [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
10. Management Ability [1 2 3 4 5] [1 2 3
11. Motivation/Incentives [1 2 3 4 51 [1 2 3
2. In your opinion, which of the followings would help to
make the.joint venture more profitable? Please indicate
the importance with the following 5 points scale:
1= Most important
2= Secondary important
3= Important
4= Not very important
5= Not significant
[1 2 3 4 51 More freehands in the incentive system
[1 2 3 4 51 More authorities to the Chinese management
[1 2 3 4 51 Stronger and better trained Chinese
management
[1 2 3 4 5) Paid the workers better
[1 2 3 4 51 The technical staff and managers
should be paid higher
[1 2 3 4 5) Disciplinary systems should be stronger
[1 2 3 4 5) Better and more training
[1 2 3 4 5) Employ better educated workers/staffs
[1 2 3 4 5) More cooperation from Chinese Partners
[1 2 3 4 5] Less red-tape and more clear-cut division
of authority in PRC Government Bureaus
[1 2 3 4 5) Less Party intervensions
[1 2 3 4 5) Less bureaucratic intervensions
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3. Do you see any improvement with the recent announcement
(Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic
of China for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment,
Oct 11) in the investment climate?
[] Yes, it is improving[] Hope that it will improve
[] Not yet[] Not related
4. Your comments, if any:
THE END-
The followings are for control purposes only. Your name and
company will be kept anonymous. But if you think that it is
not convenient, please leave it blank.
POSITION:NAME:
TEL:COMPANY:
[] N o[] YesDo you mind an interview?
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